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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the relationships between Russia’s arms export industry and 
three major customer states in Asia. What motivated China, India, and Vietnam to 
procure conventional arms from Russian rather than other major suppliers, particularly in 
the post–Cold War era? The answer is a complex mix of strategic goals, political 
rationale, financial affordability, technological suitability, and old habit. This thesis 
centers on individual case studies for each of the three customer states, and is bookended 
by an opening review of the modern Russian arms industry and a final discussion of 
common themes and what to expect from future arms transfers from Russia. It uses press 
reporting, analysis by independent organizations, and a framework incorporating theories 
of international relations to address the research question. The main intention of this 
thesis is to examine the role of arms transfers across multiple states both as a practice per 
se, and as a component of national (and international) policy; additionally, it is designed 
to provide value to military personnel who wish to become more familiar with this 
important topic. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis addresses three major customer nations of the Russian arms export 
industry in Asia, an area of increasing importance to United States foreign policy: China, 
India and Vietnam. For these importers of conventional arms, what are the advantages of 
purchasing Russian systems?  
Specifically, how has Russia incentivized and developed its export deals in this 
region to make them more appealing to potential customers? To what extent have arms 
transfers provided the recipient nation with a desired capability at a cost, timeline, or 
technology level that the recipient cannot attain via domestic production or from another 
supplier? How do recipients use any technology transfer resulting from arms deals? Are 
they motivated by a desire on the part of the importing nation to establish a particular 
political posture (either positive or negative in orientation)? What, if anything, is the role 
of path dependency? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The defense industry forms a substantial portion of the Russian economy, and the 
Russian military is undertaking a significant modernization effort. Russia is among the 
world’s most prolific exporters of conventional arms, both new and second-hand. While 
much ink has been spilled over Russia’s (and the Soviet Union’s) robust arms export trade 
as a revenue-generating element of the economy and a means of paying for military 
modernization along with a return to world power status, somewhat less attention has been 
paid to the use of the arms trade as a means of establishing economic and strategic relations 
with potential importers, several of whom are themselves rising major powers.  
The global arms trade is a multi-billion-dollar industry with the potential to 
influence economic, political, and strategic relations between states. Foreign military sales 
may serve as one element within a state’s pursuit of its interests. If conducted in accordance 
with U.S. interests, arms proliferation can enhance the security of American allies and 
partners; if conducted contrary to U.S. interests, it can also shift strategic balance away 
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from American interests. In either case, if done carelessly, it can bring about undesired 
destruction or prolong conflicts. Since the United States is not the world’s only major arms 
exporter, it is helpful to consider the customers and motivations of other countries’ arms 
export industries, particularly since developing states are playing an increasingly 
prominent role in the global arena, acting primarily but not exclusively as consumers in the 
international arms trade. Analyzing the reasons that regimes choose to purchase Russian 
weapons systems, both in general and in preference over other foreign systems, may help 
American policymakers better understand how to interact with these states. 
This thesis is also intended to bring together theories of international relations and 
specific instances of military sales in a manner that is useful and accessible to U.S. military 
personnel who may encounter foreign militaries and dignitaries, as well as develop new 
systems. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The role of the arms trade within a larger strategic, political or economic context is 
typically implied but not dwelt on in most current research. As such, authors frequently 
reference the arms trade as a given part of a broader field under discussion or focus on 
trade specifics per se, but less often seek to establish how the conduct of the arms trade 
influences, or is influenced by, buyer state efforts to build political, strategic or commercial 
relationships. Ian Anthony does ask these questions in Russia and the Arms Trade, 
separating answers into “four ‘baskets’ of issues and the interaction between them … 
politico-military issues, economic issues, industrial issues and technological issues,” but 
with a publication date of 1998 the book cannot take into account more recent 
modernization trends in the Russian and many other militaries.1 Stephen Walt’s The Origin 
of Alliances also proposes multiple non-strategic factors that may influence alliance 
formation, although he concludes that the origins of alliances and alignments are best 
                                                 
1 Ian Anthony, “Trends in Post-Cold War International Arms Transfers,” in Russia and the Arms 
Trade, ed. Ian Anthony (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 16. 
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explained by an overarching threat calculus rather than disparate elements such as foreign 
aid and ideological commonalities per se.2  
The scholarly consensus is that Russian arms exports are significant, although 
specific figures are elusive due to the nature of the industry, which is sensitive, 
multifaceted, and often classified in the details.3 Multiple organizations devote resources 
toward quantifying components of defense industries and military expenditures worldwide. 
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) maintains several 
comprehensive databases of relevant information dating back to the 1950s and publishes 
extensively on arms trade topics, while Jane’s Defense Group provides up-to-date reporting 
on new military developments and current orders of battle.  
Russia is generally acknowledged as the second most prolific arms export state in 
the world, behind only the United States.4 However, another common theme in the 
literature is that Russian industries have struggled to compete on the post-Cold War 
international arms market to a greater degree than in the 1950s through 1980s, as Trenin 
and Pierre noted in 1997.5 This was in large part due to the Soviet Union’s ability to set 
arbitrarily low prices and export Russian-made weapons throughout the Soviet Union and 
greater Warsaw Treaty Organization unchallenged.6 SIPRI estimates that, while in the 
latter 1980s Soviet exports of major conventional systems comprised 38 percent of the 
                                                 
2 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 263–72. 
Walt does argue that many of the disparate elements are simply components or results of threat balancing – 
foreign aid, for example, makes the recipient stronger to balance a common adversary, while 
simultaneously signaling to the recipient state that the aid-giver’s own intentions are friendly. 
3 Aude Fleurant, “Arms Production and Military Services,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2015: Armaments, 
Disarmament and International Security, eds. Ian Davis et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
450–451; Ian Anthony, Introduction to Russia and the Arms Trade, ed. Ian Anthony (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 14–15. 
4 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables,” SIPRI, 
March 11, 2019, https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php. 
5 Dmitrii Trenin and Andrew J. Pierre, “Arms Trade Rivalry in the Future of Russian-American 
Relations,” in Russia in the World Arms Trade, eds. Andrew J. Pierre and Dmitrii Trenin (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 115, 121–22; Anthony, Introduction to Russia and the 
Arms Trade, 4. 
6 Eugene Kogan, “The Russian Defense Industry 1991–2008: From the Collapse of the Former Soviet 
Union to the Global Financial Crisis,” in The Modern Defense Industry: Political, Economic, and 
Technological Issues, ed. Richard A. Bitzinger (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2009), 
197. 
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global market, “by 1992 the Russian share had declined to 12 per cent of the world total 
and in 1994” to a low of “only 3 per cent.”7 Kogan argues that control of the Russian 
defense sector has increasingly re-nationalized since 2006, but this has not brought a return 
of low costs.8 Despite rising costs, the Russian arms industry has been sustained under the 
Vladimir Putin administration by a combination of increased domestic demand, brought on 
by an ambitious $645 billion modernization program, and a robust international market.9 
These factors impact the Russian defense industry’s inventory, capacity and need for 
foreign customers. 
Russia’s most lucrative export markets are located in Asia due to the ascendancy 
of China and India as regional (or worldwide) powerhouses with expanding conventional 
arms needs.10 The literature addressing the political, military and economic rise of each 
vastly exceeds the scope of this thesis, but several works have been particularly informative 
to this thesis for framing these customer states’ strategic and military priorities. In his 2005 
book China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils, Robert Sutter examines China’s national 
goals and international relationships since the founding of the modern Chinese state, 
addressing the nuances of Beijing’s “strategic partnership” with Moscow throughout.11 
David Malone’s Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy, 
published in 2011, provides a similar foundation for India since the 1940s.12 Ryan Clark 
                                                 
7 Anthony, Introduction to Russia and the Arms Trade, 4. 
8 Kogan, “The Russian Defense Industry 1991–2008,” 197. 
9 Sam Perlo-Freeman, “Russian Military Expenditure, Reform and Restructuring,” in SIPRI Yearbook 
2013: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, eds. Tilman Brück et al. (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 142. 
10 SIPRI, “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables.” NOTE: All TIV tables use trend-indicator values 
expressed in constant 1990 U.S. dollars, a unit that is unique to the SIPRI databases, rather than actual 
financial cost (either real or adjusted for inflation). These values are meant to express volume and a 
standardized worth based on type and condition of equipment transferred rather than actual price paid, as 
financial data may be unavailable or subject to excessive manipulation. A full explanation can be found on 
the SIPRI arms transfer database methodology webpage, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/
armstransfers/background. SIPRI estimates that Russia has exported an equivalent value to $121.3 billion 
in arms from 1991–2015; of this total, $80.7 billion have gone to Asian states ($26.9 billion since 2010). 
11 Robert G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 2005), 107. 
12 David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance?: Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
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argues that Vietnamese force modernization was driven by an external Chinese threat as 
well as internal desires for economic development in his 2014 master’s thesis, “Vietnam’s 
Drive to Modernize Militarily—Causes and Implications.”13 Finally, power dynamics in 
the South China Sea have been treated in multiple works by organizations including the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies.14  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Drawing on the frameworks provided by existing literature, one hypothesis is that 
customer states in Asia are motivated to purchase Russian arms by political concerns. Some 
customer states may seek to leverage weapons imports for a positive political outcome 
(e.g., friendlier relations with Russia), but others may seek a negative political outcome 
(e.g., rejection of relations with a third party such as the United States or an attempt to deter 
a third party such as China). Other customer states may be pursuing a non-alignment 
strategy, and as such, they may deliberately seek to balance strategic military relationships 
with both Western and non-Western powers. 
A second hypothesis is that customer states in Asia are motivated by economic or 
technological concerns—essentially seeking the best commercial return on their 
investment due to a limited defense budget. Such returns could include things like 
technology transfer programs, joint development programs, personnel training, 
maintenance contracts, future systems upgrades and discounted future sales. Some states 
may be influenced by a form of institutional and industrial inertia: lack of desire to develop 
indigenous production capability, or lack of desire to switch producer countries. This might 
be motivated by a desire for systems continuity and interoperability. 
Since states are complex organisms with many interests, these hypotheses are not 
mutually exclusive; however, I discuss whether one tends to be more salient than the others 
                                                 
13 Ryan S. Clark, “Vietnam’s Drive to Modernize Militarily - Causes and Implications” (master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2014), 73–77, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/44539.  
14 Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus and Jake Douglas, Countering 
Coercion in Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield, 2017); Anton Tsvetov, “Russia’s Tactics and Strategy in the South China Sea,” Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, November 1, 2016, https://amti.csis.org/russias-tactics-strategy-south-
china-sea/. 
 6 
to a particular case, since that might help predict a state’s most likely future courses of 
action. For example, a customer state that strongly values an existing strategic or political 
partnership might elect to purchase arms from the partner nation, turning down offers from 
alternate suppliers that are more financially favorable, are better tailored to the military 
needs of the customer state, or have fewer strings attached. Alternately, a supplier state’s 
demonstrated willingness to provide highly favorable transfer terms to one customer could 
inspire follow-on deals with other customer states, with implications for regional security. 
Overall, I find that both the first and second hypotheses were applicable in customer 
states' motivations to procure conventional arms and associated technology from Russia. 
However, customer states’ starting points and desired end states varied, and the relative 
importance of economic, technological and political concerns to their arms transfer regimes 
tended to transform over time within each customer state. Overall, a third hypothesis 
prevails: arms transfers have been motivated by a dynamic mix of internal and external 
factors, resulting in a complex economic, strategic and political relationship with Russia. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The nature of the relationship between Russia and a particular customer state is of 
individual importance; this thesis treats the identification of wider trends as a major 
component, but not as the sole purpose of the thesis. Nonetheless, a single case study is not 
sufficient to characterize relations between Russia and its arms export customer states. The 
main body of thesis therefore consists of three comparative case studies: bilateral relations 
between Russia and China, India and Vietnam. I focus on post-Cold War developments, 
although some pre-1991 background is necessary.  
China and India were selected as case studies because they are two of Russia’s most 
significant conventional arms importers, and they have been of increasing independent 
interest to United States policy makers since the end of the Cold War. Both nations have 
purchased major terrestrial, airborne and seaborne platforms and systems; in the case of 
India, it has also undertaken several joint development projects with Russia. Vietnam was 
selected due to its status as a minor but expanding military power within Southeast Asia; 
the state’s growing defense budget has funded major procurements from both Russia and 
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Western states. Vietnam will likely take a more assertive regional role in the coming years, 
particularly given its stake in international territorial disputes. 
Prior to addressing the case studies, a general overview of the Russian arms 
industry and export trade since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union is given. This is 
necessary to establish historical context and to highlight that twenty-first century Russian 
politics exists on the same continuum as Soviet politics; despite the downfall of the USSR, 
many of the same institutions and lawmakers remained in power in post-communist Russia. 
It is also intended to highlight trends in export patterns since 1991. Additionally, Soviet 
military development (and frequent over-production) has left modern Russia with a surplus 
of aging equipment, thus potentially impacting contemporary Russian export patterns. 
The thesis uses press reporting, official announcements, and publicly available 
records of defense agreements and arms transfers, such as those collected by the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as primary sources. Due to the typically 
sensitive nature of weapons acquisition, these sources often do not provide exhaustive 
information on Russian arms exports; they should, however, be sufficient to draw general 
conclusions about major systems and trends. Secondary sources include scholarly analyses 
of strategic relations between Russia and the three case study states. 
A note about numbers: due to the sensitive nature of the defense industry, most of 
the currency amounts given in this thesis are estimates. In addition, I make extensive use 
of trend-indicator value (TIV) assessments from the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI). Those figures are normalized to SIPRI’s proprietary scale and 
do not necessarily reflect the monetary amounts actually involved in the relevant transfer 
arrangements.15 The use of TIVs attempts to compensate for fluctuating exchange rates, 
artificially devalued currency, subsidization/payment with commodities, and other factors 
that can distort the value of equipment changing hands. When not explicitly noted in the 
text, the footnote will clarify the source of a number or value that is referenced in the thesis. 
                                                 
15 “Sources and Methods,” SIPRI, accessed November 30, 2019, https://www.sipri.org/databases/
armstransfers/sources-and-methods. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This paper opens with a survey of the Russian arms export industry since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Although this is enough material for several theses, I focus 
on the transition from a centralized toward a privatized economy, post-Cold War 
technological changes, Russian military modernization in the Putin era, and the general 
effects of each of these on the arms industry. 
The following chapters cover three individual country case studies: China, India 
and Vietnam. Each case study begins with a sketch of the state’s major political 
developments, strategic interests and defense-related policies. It then describes and 
evaluates Russian weapons imports to the state since 1991, with comparisons to Soviet-era 
transfers as applicable. Each chapter addresses the main and subsidiary research questions 
posed at the beginning of this proposal. I have elected to include end-user case studies, 
rather than devoting the whole thesis to a general survey of the Russian arms industry from 
the Russian perspective, because the case study format is more likely to reveal relative 
importance of politics, strategy, technology and economy in a particular state, all of which 
influence its government’s decision to import foreign arms. 
  
 9 
II. THE RUSSIAN ARMS EXPORT INDUSTRY 
Russia is the second largest exporter of military and dual-use systems in the world, 
behind only the United States. However, precise figures are difficult to derive. Russia is 
not a signatory to the UN’s 2013 Arms Trade Treaty, which requires annual reporting on 
export values with optional reporting on description and purpose.16 Even if Moscow had 
signed on, the treaty defines arms transfer activity too narrowly—as “export, import, 
transit, trans-shipment and brokering”—to provide much insight into peripheral practices 
like licensed production and maintenance contracts, which are also an important element 
of the Russian arms industry.17 Although Russia is a party to the 2005 Wassenaar 
Arrangement, which also calls for routine reporting on military and dual-use exports in the 
name of antiterrorism, adherence to those terms is strictly voluntary.18 
This chapter gives an overview of the structure and focuses of Russian arms 
manufacturing industries, starting during the Warsaw Treaty era but primarily since the 
end of the Soviet Union. It also discusses major Russian arms manufacturers, military 
modernization and advancements in military technology. Finally, it concludes with a brief 
analysis of the security implications for the wider world and proposes a set of motivations 
for states choosing to purchase Russian-made arms. 
A. ARMS TRANSFERS UNDER THE WARSAW PACT 
The Soviet Union (and within the USSR, Russia) dominated weapons manufacture 
within the larger Warsaw Treaty Organization. Soviet arms exports similarly dwarfed 
exports from individual WTO satellite states, averaging about $6.9 billion in annual exports 
from 1955 to the Sino-Soviet split of 1961; $9.6 billion per year during the remainder of 
                                                 
16 “Arms Trade Treaty,” entered into force December 24, 2014, Treaty Series: Treaties and 
International Agreements Registered or File and Recorded with the Secretariat of the United Nations, no. 
52373 (2013): 3, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/52373/Part/I-52373-
08000002803628c4.pdf. 
17 “Arms Trade Treaty,” 3. 
18 “About Us,” Wassenaar Arrangement, last modified August 9, 2019, https://www.wassenaar.org/
about-us. 
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the 1960s; $13.6 billion each year through the 1970s; and $14.2 billion annually in the 
1980s.19 This is attributable largely to the high degree of equipment standardization 
enforced under the Warsaw Pact as well as to the Soviet Union’s greater population, 
manufacturing capacity and emphasis on the defense industry over consumer 
manufacturing.20  
The total value of arms exports to WTO states remained relatively consistent, 
varying from a 1950s annual average of $3.1 billion to a 1960s average of approximately 
$3.9 billion, and declining to $3.4 billion in the 1980s.21 Exports to Warsaw Pact states 
comprised a significant but decreasing portion of total Soviet arms exports, whose volume 
underwent boom-and-bust cycles in other markets: China, for example, provided the most 
lucrative single market during the 1950s, but dwindled following the Sino-Soviet split, 
while Libya and Iraq became major recipients of Soviet arms starting in the middle to late 
1970s.22  
Compulsory dependence of the Warsaw Pact states on Soviet weapons designs and 
export equipment tended to stifle indigenous technological creativity. A few non-Soviet 
designs, such as Czech aircraft and armored vehicles, came to enjoy popular usage within 
the Warsaw Pact outside their country of origin. Non-Soviet states were forced to balance 
“demands of domestic weapons production and sale in peacetime with the needs of military 
efficiency”—a task of which Moscow was generally supportive, given that satellite states’ 
defense industries might “provide excess capacity for the alliance” in a future crisis.23 
Despite the dominance of the Soviet arms industry, other Eastern bloc states still 
maintained their own indigenous arms production and export capability. Czechoslovakia, 
                                                 
19 SIPRI, “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables.” 
20 William J. Lewis, The Warsaw Pact: Arms, Doctrine, and Strategy (Cambridge, MA: Institute for 
Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982), 122. 
21 SIPRI, “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables.” 
22 SIPRI. NOTE: TIVs. WTO member states received approximately 45 percent of all Soviet arms 
exports (by value) before 1961; 41 percent from 1962–1969; 28 percent in the 1970s; and 24 percent in the 
1980s and 1990.  
23 Condoleezza Rice, “Defense Burden-Sharing,” in The Warsaw Pact: Alliance in Transition?, eds. 
David Holloway and Jane Sharp (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), 77. 
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for example, exported $28.7 billion in arms over the life of the Warsaw Pact, while Poland 
exported nearly $6.7 billion; East Germany, $828 million; and Romania, $784 million over 
the same time period.24 Except in the case of Romania, Moscow was the primary recipient 
of arms exports from these countries—over seventy percent of Czechoslovakian, Polish 
and East German exports by value were shipped to the Soviet Union, while most of the 
remainder shipped to regimes allied with Moscow.25 This ratio changed over time, 
however, with the “third world” share of the export market increasing rapidly in the 1980s 
as Warsaw Pact states autonomously sought new markets to sustain their indigenous 
defense industries.26 Exports to Western and NATO-allied regimes were virtually 
nonexistent. While perhaps not surprising, this statistic stands in sharp contrast to the 
relatively robust level of non-military trade between the Soviet sphere of influence and the 
West. In this respect, the structure of the arms trade under the Warsaw Pact was not a 
completely closed system, but rather a system with a clear outer boundary and a single hub: 
the Soviet Union.  
The Soviet military budget on the eve of the USSR’s collapse would still dwarf 
current Russian military expenditures, despite recent spending increases. SIPRI estimates 
that Moscow allocated $340 billion to the military budget in 1988, and $270 billion in —
and these numbers themselves were dwarfed by the Reagan- and Bush-era U.S. military 
budgets with which the Politburo was trying to keep pace.27 In the years following the 
collapse, military spending declined; 1992 spending was less than five percent of 1990 
levels, and the large nominal budget increases over the next years were negated by the 
                                                 
24 SIPRI, “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables.” As for the remaining WTO members’ arms exports, 
exports either amounted to under $250 million during the life of the Warsaw Pact (Hungary, Bulgaria) or 
no data is available from SIPRI (Armenia). 
25 SIPRI. NOTE: TIVs. In the case of Romania, 38 percent of its total arms exports by value were 
bound for the Soviet Union; another 24 percent came from a three-year span in 1982–1984 when Romania 
furnished the government of Iraq with 150 T-55 tanks. 
26 Rice, “Defense Burden-Sharing,” 75–76. 
27 “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” SIPRI, March 11, 2019, https://www.sipri.org/databases/
milex. Numbers are given in 2014 USD unless stated otherwise in the footnote. 
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severe inflation from the transition to the market economy. Adjusted to 2014 U.S. dollars, 
Russian military expenditures reached a nadir of $19.2 billion in 1998.28  
The struggling economy severely limited Moscow’s research and development 
capacity and emphasized the need for foreign money, while the warming atmosphere of 
U.S.-Russian relations provided another impetus to dispose of unneeded-era Soviet 
systems: to former WTO states whose militaries now seemed incomplete without some 
international framework, to disgruntled Middle Eastern autocratic regimes, and to the rising 
powers in South and East Asia. However, the transition to the market economy never 
finished with the liberal outcome Western politicians hoped for, and conversion of Soviet 
defense industries to civilian purposes remained incomplete. The rise of the oligarchs—
individuals wielding massive influence over key industries or services—that began under 
Gorbachev would continue into the new millennium, setting the stage for a new autocracy 
and the re-nationalization of the Russian arms industries, insofar as they had ever been 
effectively private. 
B. RUSSIAN ARMS INDUSTRY STRUCTURE AND PATTERNS 
A common theme in the literature is that the arms industries of present-day Russia, 
to a greater degree than the bipolar world power structure days of the Cold War, have had 
to struggle to stay relevant in the face of increased international competition and decreased 
resources.29 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organization, Russian-made arms—which accounted for approximately 85 percent 
of total arms produced in the Soviet Union—lost a significant, ready-made export 
market.30 SIPRI estimates that, while in the latter 1980s Soviet exports of major 
conventional systems comprised 38 percent of the global market, “by 1992 the Russian 
share had declined to 12 per cent of the world total and in 1994 … to only 3 per cent,” the 
                                                 
28 SIPRI.  
29 Trenin and Pierre, “Arms Trade Rivalry in the Future of Russian-American Relations,” 115, 121–
22; Anthony, Introduction to Russia and the Arms Trade, 4. 
30 Kogan, “The Russian Defense Industry 1991–2008,” 197. 
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low point of the Russian arms export market.31 The Yeltsin administration sought to 
“recapture abandoned positions” despite downsizing the defense industry.32 The 
marketization of Russia’s economy marked an end to massive government subsidies of the 
military-industrial complex, making the artificially low prices of Soviet export systems 
impossible to sustain. Although control of the Russian defense industry has increasingly 
re-nationalized since 2006, consolidation has not brought down costs.33 By 2013, however, 
the Russian arms trade had recovered to 7.9 percent of the world market and was worth an 
estimated $32 billion.34 Domestic demand has risen as well; under Vladimir Putin, the 
Kremlin has undertaken an ambitious modernization program that will invest $645 billion 
in weapons and systems upgrades by 2020.35 These trends have likely impacted the 
Russian defense industry’s inventory, capacity and need for foreign customers. Russia’s 
most lucrative export markets are currently in Asia.36 
The defense industry in Russia today is dominated by conglomerates in a 
patrimonial relationship with the government. The Putin regime has both encouraged and 
mandated the trend of conglomeration, although state control of the defense industry in 
Russia is a used concept, and despite the fact that the resulting organizations are often not 
cost-effective. This section will describe the relationship between the state and the defense 
industrial sector (DIS), outline the current major manufacturers of Russian military 
equipment, and identify several trends within the industry as a whole. 
At the center of the DIS is Rosoboronexport (ROE), the primary “state agency for 
arms sales.” With predecessor bureaus in the Soviet government since the 1950s, the 
current agency was created in November 2000 through consolidation and since the ascent 
of Vladimir Putin “has become an industrial behemoth that is monopolizing whole sectors 
                                                 
31 Anthony, Introduction to Russia and the Arms Trade, 4. 
32 Trenin and Pierre, “Arms Trade Rivalry in the Future of Russian-American Relations,” 119. 
33 Kogan, “The Russian Defense Industry 1991–2008,” 197. 
34 Fleurant, “Arms Production and Military Services,” 445. 
35 Perlo-Freeman, “Russian Military Expenditure, Reform and Restructuring,” 142. 
36 SIPRI, “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables.” SIPRI estimates that Russia has exported an equivalent 
value to $121.3 billion in arms from 1991–2015; of this total, $80.7 billion have gone to Asian states ($26.9 
billion since 2010). 
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of this industry on behalf of the state.”37 After the anemic 1990s, the revival of the Russian 
arms industry has been due in large part to the top-down policies of Vladimir Putin’s 
regime, as well as a more favorable geopolitical climate facilitating increased domestic and 
foreign procurement. 
Arrayed around ROE are the defense industries, clustered functionally. To say that 
there is a robust military-industrial complex in Russia would be misleading by 
understatement. Having emerged from the fatally militarized Soviet Union, the 
contemporary state and the defense industry are still far more closely intertwined than they 
are in the United States, for example, and they have become even more tightly linked 
during the first and second Putin administrations.38 The Kremlin and its siloviki have 
formed a patrimonial, or perhaps a neo-NEP type, relationship.39 This system, marked by 
rent-seeking behavior by nominally private individuals, is marginally profitable at best, yet 
largely justified or rationalized by government officials as the best way to align official 
strategic thinking with production capabilities.40 The primary symptom of such a 
relationship is the state corporation—whose stock may be jointly owned by its 
shareholders, but whose existence and (to a varying extent) funding are mandated by the 
government. Naturally, many of the stockholders were government appointees.  
In 2006 the United Aircraft Corporation consolidated the formerly discrete Sukhoi, 
Irkut, Mikoyan-and-Gurevich, Ilyushin, Tupolev and Yakovlev firms under one state-
controlled umbrella, although each company has continued to manufacture their respective 
fixed-wing aircraft along more or less similar lines of specialization as before the merger.41 
The following year, the Putin administration founded Rostec, another state corporation, 
whose purview includes Russian Helicopters, the company responsible for rotary-wing 
                                                 
37 Stephen J. Blank, Rosoboroneksport: Arms Sales and the Structure of Russian Defense Industry 
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), 5. 
38 Blank3. 
39 Blank, 6. 
40 Blank, 7, 9. 
41 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “SIPRI Arms Industry Database,” SIPRI, 
March 11, 2019, https://www.sipri.org/databases/armsindustry. Employment estimates were unavailable. 
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aircraft research, development and manufacture in Russia and whose employees numbered 
about 42,000 in 2014.42 Almaz-Antey, the largest Russian arms manufacturing 
organization by revenue and itself the product of a 2002 merger, focuses on the 
development and production of air defense systems and employed nearly 100,000 people 
in 2014.43 Russian ship-building is similarly consolidated under the United Shipbuilding 
Corporation, with 287,000 workers spread primarily over the corporation’s three main 
subsidiaries.44 Additional conglomerations for terrestrial vehicles, instruments, engines, 
electronics and short-range missiles manufacturing exist as well. Because of their size and 
the scale of accompanying graft, however, in addition to the nature of their manufactures 
and the feast-or-famine character of the international arms market, these organizations are 
not always solvent even within Russia’s defense industry; in fact they frequently suffer 
from annual losses and bankruptcy. 
Looking at sales of military and civil equipment among the major Russian firms 
that manufacture conventional arms, several patterns emerge that are unique to Russia 
among major arms manufacturers. First, it is immediately clear that the organizational 
structure of the Russian defense industry is different from those of Western and Asian 
counterparts, simply by virtue of the number of Russian subsidiary companies on SIPRI’s 
list of the world’s “Top 100” arms manufacturers, independently large enough to merit a 
mention.  This number is decreasing, however, as the Putin administration continues to 
consolidate manufacturers.  
Second, as can be seen in Figure 1, the Russian corporations that manufacture 
military systems tend to rely on arms sales (rather than manufacture of equipment for 
civilian businesses) as a source of income to a far greater extent than major arms 
manufacturers elsewhere in the world. Figure 1, adapted from SIPRI data covering the 
world’s “Top 100” arms manufacturer between 2002 and 2018, illustrates this disparity.  
For the average Russian “Top 100” company, sales of military equipment account for 





approximately seventy to ninety percent of its revenue; elsewhere in the world, the average 
“Top 100” arms manufacturer derives just over half of its revenue this way.45 The 
difference is even starker when one takes the revenues of massive organizations like 
General Electric, ThyssenKrupp, Mitsubishi and Airbus into account. While such 
companies are involved enough in the arms manufacturing business to rank in SIPRI's “Top 
100” list, their interests in civilian sectors are so extensive that arms sales account for less 
than twenty percent of their overall income; none of them are Russian.46 
Figure 1. Arms Sales as Portion of SIPRI “Top 100” Firms’ Total 
Revenue, per Company and Overall47 
 
  
                                                 
45 SIPRI. It should be noted that these lists often exceed 100 entries, as large enough subsidiary 
companies are included but do not receive a numbered ranking. It should also be caveated that these “Top 
100” lists obviously do not take into account independent companies that are too small to make the list; 
however, I believe SIPRI’s figures provide a reasonably accurate picture of the overall patterns, particularly 
given the Russian defense sector’s penchant for conglomeration. Finally, these figures exclude Chinese 
manufacturers, as SIPRI does not have enough information to make accurate comparisons, although the 
authors observe that several Chinese companies would undoubtedly make the list. 
46 SIPRI. 
47 Adapted from SIPRI, “SIPRI Arms Industry Database.” 
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This is due to several factors, discussed above, and persists despite state 
encouragement for the firms to increase production of civilian equipment. One obvious 
effect of the current situation, however, is that Russian arms manufacturing companies 
continue to go through periods of extreme austerity if military sales dry up—domestically, 
abroad or both—and thus have often been reliant on state subsidies during slower 
procurement periods. The reliance on arms manufacture also incentivizes foreign military 
sales, which in turn often dovetail with the government’s political priorities. Thus, the 
tangled relationship between the Kremlin and the ostensibly nationalized firms that 
produce the bulk of military systems in Russia is multi-layered, with roots in previous eras; 
no regime change in Russia has completely erased the older systems on which it is built.  
A third trend also becomes clear: the Russian defense industry has been regaining 
lost ground since the early 2000s, both in terms of the market share and in absolute figures, 
despite setbacks in Russia’s other major economic sectors. In 2002 (the earliest year for 
which data are available), only four of SIPRI’s “Top 100” arms manufacturing companies 
were Russian: all made planes or aerospace equipment, and none ranked higher than thirty-
seventh on the list.48 For contrast, forty-seven of the Top 100 were American companies 
or subsidiaries, and nine were German. In 2008, Russian corporations claimed eight slots 
on the list, ranging from seventeenth to ninety-eighth. Finally, by 2014, nineteen of SIPRI’s 
Top 100 companies were Russian (although eight of these entries are subsidiaries of the 
larger state corporations on the list), with Almaz-Antey reaching the eleventh slot and with 
a far more diverse offering of systems represented. By comparison, U.S. firms made the 
list forty-three times, and Germany three times in 2014. DIS arms sales from the Russian 
members of the Top 100 to domestic and foreign customers have grown in the new 
century—from an estimated $2.96 billion in 2002 to $40.75 billion in 2014, although recent 
years have seen a slight downturn.49  
Figure 2 shows these numbers as percentages of total arms production. Demand has 
grown both at home and abroad. Russian DIS corporations have struggled to diversify, but 
                                                 
48 SIPRI. 
49 SIPRI. Amounts are adjusted for inflation to 2014 U.S. dollars. 
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they have certainly found a renewed market for their military products—the reasons for 
which will be discussed in Section II.D below. 
Figure 2. Russian Company Sales as Portion of SIPRI “Top 100” 
Sales50 
 
A final trend, not unique to Russia, is that worldwide defense spending has 
continued to expand slowly for the last fifteen years, even as Western militaries prepare to 
downsize.51 The expansion is due to both modernization and increasing foreign military 
sales. The Russian defense industry itself, as we have seen, has grown at a much more rapid 
pace than average. 
  
                                                 
50 Adapted from SIPRI, “SIPRI Arms Industry Database.” 
51 SIPRI. 
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C. RUSSIAN ARMS INDUSTRY CAPABILITIES AND MODERNIZATION 
The Putin and Medvedev administrations took advantage of Russia’s recovering 
economy in the 2000s to fund a military recovery and modernization. As Figure 3 shows, 
Russian military expenditures since the late 1990s have increased from three percent of 
GDP in 1998 to over five percent of GDP in 2015, representing a large increase in its 
proportion of overall government spending in addition to the absolute increases due to the 
burgeoning economy. 
Figure 3. Russian Military Expenditures as Portion of State Spending 
and GDP52 
 
Figure 4 illustrates that, partly due to the rampant inflation of the ruble in the 1990s, 
the Russian state never significantly decreased funding to the military. The rate of increase 
simply could not keep up with the rate of inflation during the Yeltsin era. However, with 
inflation under control by the turn of the century and with the energy and heavy industrial 
sectors booming during the first Putin administration, the military became more solvent in 
2008 than in 1998. Since the turn of the century, Russia has attempted to transition from 
                                                 
52 Adapted from SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.” 
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reliance on Soviet-era equipment to an emphasis on sophisticated sensors, integrated 
command and control systems, and high-end weapons and delivery systems. However, 
Western sanctions imposed following the Putin administration’s 2014 annexation of the 
Crimean peninsula and its continuing involvement in eastern Ukraine took a heavy toll on 
the Russian economy, causing rapid devaluation of the ruble and probably forcing the 
recent downturn in military spending. The fact that—five years later—the Crimean 
annexation still has not spurred significant NATO intervention may also be contributing to 
lower military spending, which peaked during the timeframe when Western military 
reaction in Ukraine seemed likeliest. 
Figure 4. Overall Russian Military Expenditures53 
 
The greatest emphasis has been on development and deployment of more advanced 
airborne and anti-air platforms, including fifth-generation fighter jets, stealth technology, 
supersonic and hypersonic cruise missiles, and integrated air defense systems. The 
replacement of older platforms will likely create a convenient inventory for future exports, 
while kit-style or other discrete upgrades to existing systems could be sold to states that 
                                                 
53 Adapted from SIPRI, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database.” The scale selection of fifty millions 
of rubles was chosen for ease of visual reference against the U.S. dollar. 
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are using the compatible Soviet or Russian systems. In a 2016 interview, Lieutenant 
General Viktor Gumennyy, the“commander of PVO-PRO (Air Defense-Missile Defense 
Troops) and deputy commander in chief of Aerospace Forces, stated that 
The air defense and missile defense system of the Russian Federation’s 
Aerospace Forces has undergone substantial changes in the last few years. 
Today it can be said that the Antiaircraft Missile Troops, the Radiotechnical 
Troops, and the Missile Defense Troops are ensuring the secure defense of 
our state. Igor Yuryevich [also being interviewed] has correctly observed 
that a state that does not show concern for its air defense system is quite 
simply doomed.54 
Lieutenant General Gumennyy continues to name a litany of systems undergoing 
significant upgrades within the Russian air and missile defense forces, including the S-400 
(NATO reporting name SA-21 Growler) and upgraded S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) surface-
to-air missile systems, mentioning also the Pantsir-S integrated missile and gun system and 
development of a “long-range intercept missile” which “will definitely enable any mission 
set for the air defense and missile defense” forces.55  
In the maritime domain, Russia has undertaken construction of two new classes of 
nuclear-powered submarines: the Borey or Dolgorukiy class, capable of carrying ballistic 
missiles, as well as the Severodvinsk-class fast-attack submarine. The four fleets have also 
planned the phased replacement of Soviet-era Sovremennyy-class destroyers and Krivak 
frigates with twenty to thirty multipurpose Admiral Gorshkov-class frigates, the first of 
which was laid down in 2006.56 Russian naval forces have also placed increasingly 
sophisticated stand-off weapons on minor naval platforms, with the first of six Vasily Bykov 
corvettes, capable of carrying the Kalibr (NATO reporting name SS-N-27 Sizzler) cruise 
                                                 
54 “Russian Arms Expert, Aerospace Forces Aide Discuss Developments in Air Defense Systems, 
Training,” Russkaya Sluzhba Novostey Online, trans. Open Source Center, August 21, 2016, OSC ID 
CER2016082206168001. Italics mine. 
55 Russkaya Sluzhba Novostey Online. 
56 “Russian Navy to Get Project 22350 Frigate Admiral Gorshkov in 2011,” Mil.Today, February 26, 
2010, http://rusnavy.com/news/newsofday/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=8778. 
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missile, commissioned in 2018.57 The ships that these new classes replace will likely be 
prime candidates for export, as they have been in the past. Finally, according to press 
reporting, carrier-launched Su-33 Flanker-D aircraft have been equipped with smart bomb 
kit technology—potentially providing a cheap upgrade to bring Soviet-era weapons into 
the twenty-first century, increasing Russia’s ability to conduct precision airstrikes from the 
sea.58 
D. IMPACT ON THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE NEAR AND 
LONG TERMS 
From a Western perspective, these trends present new challenges regarding Russia. 
Much ink has been spent over whether Moscow has become a sated power, and if not, at 
what point it will become one. The problem of interpreting intentions lingers from the Cold 
War, particularly in light of the apparent aggressiveness of Russian foreign policy in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Syria. Russian military modernization and expansion also looks 
problematic in the face of European austerity, increasing nationalism and isolationism, and 
the possibility of future American withdrawal from Europe.  
Western states are also concerned about Russian willingness to export equipment 
to actors that are neutral or even adversarial toward the United States and its allies: India, 
China, Vietnam, Iraq, Iran and others. As we have seen above, Russian defense 
manufacturers have a strong incentive to maximize their weapons sales domestically and 
internationally. But the Kremlin has a mixed record of overseeing the responsible 
proliferation of its conventional systems; Russian-manufactured portable air defense 
systems have landed in the hands of autocrats and non-state actors. 
If Moscow tends to seek out opportunities to export Russian weapons systems, then 
the motivations and of the prospective buyers are worth examining more closely. Customer 
states may seek to leverage weapons imports for a positive political outcome (e.g., 
                                                 
57 “Advanced Caliber-Carrying Patrol Ship to Join Russian Navy in 2017,” Mil.Today, September 2, 
2016, http://mil.today/2016/Navy10/; “Russia Commissions First Project 22160 Patrol Ship Vasily Bykov,” 
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 23 
friendlier relations with the supplier or an ally), but others may seek a negative political 
outcome (e.g., rejection of relations with a third party such as the United States or an 
attempt to deter China). Some customer states—India, for example—may be pursuing a 
non-alignment strategy, and as such, they may deliberately seek to balance strategic 
military relationships with both Western and non-Western powers. From a financial 
perspective, Russian-built submarines and aircraft may present a more economical choice 
for developing countries attempting to modernize their own militaries or obtain a new 
capability; Western aircraft and submarines are costly whether conventional or nuclear. 
Additionally, while maintaining one’s existing military assets is likely within the skill and 
budget of a smaller state, that state might have neither the means nor the intention of 
creating the necessary infrastructure for indigenous production of similar assets; 
metaphorically, many states might prefer simply to buy a car rather than build one.  
In the 1990s, for example, Vietnam lacked the infrastructure and personnel training 
to support a submarine fleet—with the exception of two Yugo-class miniature submarines 
bartered from North Korea—but desired to enhance its maritime domain awareness and its 
deterrence capabilities in response to the growing power of China in the waters near 
Vietnam. After waiting several frustrating years to arrange for limited personnel training 
from India, Hanoi “turned to Russia and reached an agreement in principle to purchase six 
Project 636M Kilo-class submarines,” new rather than secondhand, at a total cost of U.S. 
$2.1 billion—roughly the same cost as construction of a single U.S. Los Angeles-class fast 
attack nuclear submarine.59 The Russian contract also included options for crew training 
and the construction and manning of an on-shore maintenance facility. The first submarine 
arrived late in 2012; although the costs of the project overran initial estimates, so did the 
scope, as Rosoboronexport agreed to construction of additional submarine infrastructure in 
Cam Ranh Bay and upgraded the initial weapons load-out of the submarines to include 
heavier torpedoes and anti-ship cruise missile capability.60  
                                                 




In addition to providing an affordable contract to Hanoi, Moscow’s willingness to 
provide extensive auxiliary services demonstrates potential value as the technologically 
best-tailored or adaptable solution across a variety of scenarios. So does the Kremlin’s 
continued interest in bilateral research and development cooperation, such as collaboration 
with India on the BrahMos cruise missile system. This would mark a change from 
purchasing Russian- or Soviet-made systems during the 1990s and early 2000s, when 
Russian systems were often decrepit, without reliable parts support, and incompatible with 
non-Soviet systems: buyer beware.61 
E. CONCLUSION 
The notion of large-scale export of weapons systems for national profit is both old 
and new. Perhaps it can be traced as far back as the idea of professional smiths and 
mercenaries, who forged or were weapons that could be wielded by the highest bidder. But 
like nuclear weapons and space travel, the Russian arms industry in its modern form arose 
during the Cold War, when the superpowers’ extended defensive networks encouraged the 
growth of large arms industries across multiple developed states.62  
While these networks were mostly self-contained, the rise of the modern arms 
industry gradually created a glut of military systems not needed by the Cold War powers, 
either because such systems had become obsolete with time or simply as a byproduct of 
excessive productivity. Then the Soviet system collapsed in on itself; when the smoke 
cleared, the governments of the 1990s no longer had the financial resources to dedicate to 
cutting-edge weapons research, nor the political will to do so even if they had. This reversal 
was felt keenly within the arms industries of the Russian Federation, the dominant 
successor state to the Soviet Union.  
Since Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ascent to power in Moscow, the Russian 
defense sector has moved toward a return to significant world influence, albeit increasingly 
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beholden to the government and thus more closely entangled with state policy at home and 
abroad. Coupled with assertive Russian foreign policy, this structure poses several unique 
challenges and opportunities for the West and for the developing world, especially the 
rapidly developing Asian states. The next chapters analyze three case studies in greater 
depth: China, India, and Vietnam. 
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III. CHINA CASE STUDY 
A. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
China’s “peaceful rise” has been the subject of intense international scrutiny. The 
world’s most populous country relies on foreign energy imports to feed its burgeoning 
economy, principally from Middle Eastern and Russian sources.63 Its increase in military 
might through the 1990s and 2000s was partly attributable to Russian exports of major 
systems like Sukhoi Flanker variant fighter aircraft, Kilo-class submarines and 
Sovremennyy-class destroyers in parallel with domestic military production.64 In the 
1990s, Russia was often willing to accept Chinese offset conditions, such as partial 
payment of contracts with consumer goods rather than currency, as a means of securing 
work for its anemic defense sector.65 However, the Chinese defense industry has 
increasingly undertaken ambitious indigenous development programs, ranging from 
warships to submarines to land-based missile systems, and has recently favored 
importation of specialized Russian-made sensors and subsystems over whole platforms.66 
Imported Russian technology has also been used as a jumping-off point for 
indigenous Chinese production, whether licensed or not, presumably after a degree of 
reverse-engineering. For example, the Shenyang J-15 Flying Shark fighter jet program is 
an unlicensed version of the Su-33 Flanker, while SIPRI hypothesizes that several naval 
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radar and gun systems installed on PLAN frigates may be unlicensed copies of Russian 
designs.67   
Despite the specter of unauthorized technology transfer, some authors have argued 
that “the Russian military itself is coming around to the idea that China poses little threat” 
from a military standpoint, and the benefits to the defense industry may outweigh the costs 
of Chinese military development.68 Beijing maintains a no-first-use nuclear policy and has 
not expressed interest in northward expansion. The PRC’s growing indigenous production 
capability, however, has certainly impacted Russian profits; the annual export rate from 
Russia to China was valued by SIPRI at approximately $2.5 billion (TIV in 1990 USD) 
between 2000–2005, peaking in 2005 at an estimated $3.1 billion, but shrank to $780 
million on average during the 2010–2015 period.69 
This chapter determines that since the 1990s, Chinese arms transfers from Russia 
have been motivated primarily by technological convenience, and secondarily by strategic 
and political effects. Specifically, Beijing’s long-term priority is to develop the full range 
of arms production domestically. Moscow has offered a practical means of building 
indigenous defense capacity, at lower material and time cost than truly independent 
development but with an acceptably low amount of political baggage. Shaping these 
dynamics was the fact that Western arms embargoes (enacted in response to human rights 
violations such as 1989’s Tiananmen Square incident) have severely limited Beijing’s 
options for military equipment and technology acquisition during the past three decades. 
As the Chinese defense sector matures, its reliance on Russian arms imports will continue 
to decrease. Additionally, under market socialism, arms manufacturers have greater 
financial incentive to expand their own export capacity, which will likely conflict with 
traditionally Russian markets. In the political realm, therefore, China will need to signal 
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“strategic partnership” with Russia via other means.70 In the military realm, this will most 
likely entail an emphasis on bilateral exercises. While Chinese defense-industrial firms will 
probably seek to collaborate with Russian companies on select advanced projects, the 
pragmatism of national and defense sector leadership makes collaboration with other 
advanced weapons-producing countries highly likely as well. 
B. SUMMARY OF POLITICAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS 
1. Imperialism, the End of the Empire and the People’s Republic 
A thorough analysis of China’s defense and foreign policies is well beyond the 
scope of this paper, but several factors are particularly salient to the development of 
contemporary Chinese arms industries and import-export patterns. Beijing’s strategic 
defense outlook has been influenced by its geography, dynastic history and, particularly 
since the nineteenth century, ugly encounters with technologically advanced foreign 
powers. Like Russia, China has traditionally been a land power, with forays into sea control 
at various points throughout its history resulting in a number of well-known voyages.71 
Proximate events to the formation of the People’s Republic of China, however, included 
the “century of humiliation” between 1839 and 1949, during which the waning Qing 
dynasty was overtaken by modern British, French and Japanese empires.72 While 
traditional enemies of China had arrived over land from the north and west, the new threat 
came from the sea. This became one of several factors to shift Beijing’s priorities toward 
defense from seaborne invasion; others included the breakaway of Taiwan from the 
mainland and the post-World War II superpower status of the United States. Oil-powered 
maritime transport and air travel influenced global trade dynamics, while the Chinese 
peasantry—already concentrated in the fertile eastern parts of the country—migrated to 
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coastal cities in search of industrial work. Beijing has accordingly increased investment in 
developing air and sea power since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949, particularly following Mao’s death in 1975, although the army still dominates the 
military, both numerically and organizationally. 
2. The Cold War: Emergence of the Chinese Defense-Industrial Sector 
In terms of defense manufacturing, the goal of Party leadership has been to harness 
China’s considerable natural and human resources to become entirely self-sufficient.73 At 
its formation, however, the PRC lacked significant defense production capability and was 
obliged to construct its military with the assistance of arms imports. Prior to the Sino-
Soviet split, Moscow furnished all of these imports—often secondhand Soviet equipment, 
overflow satellite state inventory, or military aid for Chinese forces in the Korean War.74 
Beijing also received license to indigenously produce and assemble a wide variety of Soviet 
designs, such as the MiG-17 Fresco fighter aircraft, Mi-4 Hound helicopter, T-54 tank, 
Whiskey-class submarines, and SA-2 Guideline surface-to-air missile system.75 Chinese 
arms manufacturers were assiduous students of the Soviet defense-industrial model, such 
that “by 1960 [China] was self-sufficient in many categories” of weapons production.76   
Soviet arms transfers dwindled after the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, as shown in 
Figure 5. Whereas 1950s China had received an average of $2.7 billion worth of military 
equipment each year from the Soviet Union, import values fell to an average of $355 
million during 1961–1968 and dried up altogether by 1969.77 Although Mao’s death later 
resulted in a degree of political normalization between Beijing and Moscow, with relations 
thawing further during the border troop drawdowns of the Gorbachev era, the improving 
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bilateral relations did not result in resumption of pre-split levels of arms transfers from the 
USSR to the PRC.78  
Figure 5. Soviet Arms Exports to China, SIPRI Trend-Indicator 
Values (TIV) in Millions USD, 1950–197079 
 
During the mid-1960s, Beijing began to seek arms suppliers elsewhere—notably 
from France, West Germany and Israel—although arms transfers from these countries 
never approached Soviet rates, partly because of the gains in self-sufficiency the Chinese 
defense-industrial sector had achieved.80 CATIC, the Chinese state-owned aerospace 
enterprise, made overtures toward U.S. and UK arms manufacturers in the 1980s, although 
their goal was mostly research transfer rather than acquisition of actual American or British 
systems.81  
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Chinese arms acquisitions in the 1960s-1980s consisted of a blend of direct imports 
and licensed indigenous production, in keeping with the pursuit of self-sufficiency.82 
Additionally, the systems acquired during this era tended to be newer and more 
sophisticated for their time than the secondhand Soviet imports had been, in keeping with 
the post-1975 push from Communist Party leadership for military modernization.83 The 
1960s also saw a rise in Chinese arms exports to states outside Beijing’s immediate sphere 
of influence, particularly to countries in the Middle East and Africa—markets in which the 
modern Chinese defense-industrial sector remains interested.84 
China’s arms imports from the Soviet Union were negligible between the start of 
the border war in 1969 (the low point in bilateral relations following the Sino-Soviet split) 
and 1990, the year Beijing placed its first order in decades for Soviet aircraft. By the time 
of the USSR’s collapse, China had scheduled the import of several dozen Soviet aircraft, 
ranging from the Su-24 Fencer and Su-27S Flanker ground attack fighters to the Mi-8/17 
Hip transport helicopter, and air-to-air missiles. The Russian successor state honored 
outstanding Soviet agreements, some of which entailed significant offset imports of 
Chinese consumer goods.85 
Nonetheless, in the final decade of the Cold War era, “China’s military 
modernization was … focused primarily on overcoming the PLA’s obsolescence;” 
economic growth rather than developing a cutting-edge defense industry was deemed the 
country’s “most pressing strategic goal.”86 PRC-manufactured arms tended toward strictly 
“evolutionary” developments from existing systems—progressing from licensed copy to 
                                                 
82 SIPRI, “Trade Registers.” 
83 Boutin, “Arms and Autonomy,” 219. 
84 SIPRI, “Trade Registers.” For example, SIPRI identifies Chinese arms exports to Albania 
(beginning in 1956, but picking up in 1961), Pakistan (1964), Sudan (1968), Tanzania (1970), Congo and 
Romania (1971), Guinea and Sierra Leone (1973), Egypt (1975) and Zambia (1979). 
85 SIPRI; “Russian President’s Visit may Boost China Trade for Yeltsin, Whom Chinese Leaders 
Once Branded the `new Czar,’ the Visit is a Chance to Bolster Russia’s Growing Trade with China,” 
Christian Science Monitor, December 16, 1992, ProQuest. 
86 U.S. Congress, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Report to Congress 
of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 113th Cong., 2d sess., 2014, Committee 
Print 282, http://www.uscc.gov/files/000931. 
 33 
unlicensed copy to indigenously-designed follow-on platforms—rather than experimenting 
with novel or cutting-edge technology.87 Chinese manufacturers often reverse-engineered 
licensed designs to provide a starting point for modifications and indigenously produced 
successor systems. The Chinese defense-industrial sector has yet to shake off this tendency 
in the 21st century, in part because the advent of the Internet has made foreign research 
and development more easily accessible to Beijing.  
3. The 1990s: Modernization, Marketization and the Resurgence of 
Russian Arms Imports 
After the Cold War, relations with Moscow provided to Beijing a means of 
accelerating the pursuit of its own interests – a means to an end rather than an end per se. 
In the 1990s, China’s arms manufacturers suffered from many of the same problems as 
their Soviet counterparts: “outdated … facilities, overcapacity, unprofitability, and weak 
accountability.”88 Beijing’s state-planned business model and insistence on vertical 
integration of the defense sector—measures designed to foster arms manufacturing 
autonomy—tended to stifle innovation.89 The Jiang administration was eager for China to 
participate as a major power in the new, multipolar world order that Party officials believed 
would emerge after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Chinese designs of the 
time, especially those designed for export, had a reputation as inexpensive but 
unsophisticated. Military leadership believed these would be suitable for small nations in 
the developing world, but not for a major power about to enter the twenty-first century. 
Unlike post-Cold War Russia, however, since 1991 the Chinese defense industrial 
sector has modernized fairly successfully due to marketization reforms, increasing civil-
military research integration, and a growing export market (which will likely come into 
increasing conflict with traditionally Soviet/Russian customers). It accomplished this 
modernization in significant part through the resumption of arms imports and military-
technical cooperation with foreign nations, particularly Russia.  
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4. 2000 to Present: The Turning Point for Self-sufficiency 
China has expanded both its arms imports and indigenous arms production 
capability in the twenty-first century. Vladimir Putin’s orders to expand the defense 
industry in Russia dovetailed nicely with the Jiang and Hu administrations’ desire to 
prepare for a Taiwan crisis and enhance the military’s underdeveloped stand-off weapons 
capability.90 The resultant upswing in imports was a temporary trend—a means to fill 
critical force modernization needs—and has been drawn down and refined since 2005. 
SIPRI estimates that the value of foreign arms deliveries to China peaked in 2005 at 
approximately U.S. $3.5 billion, with over eight-five percent of that value originating from 
Russia.91 While Russian imports fell in following years, arms transfers from Western 
suppliers have remained fairly stable, since they are typically highly specialized, and have 
occupied a larger share of the Chinese import market. Arms imports continued to highlight 
Beijing’s interest in standoff defense systems, including maritime systems as leadership 
strengthened claims for areas within the Nine-Dash Line. Indigenous production, however, 
has grown in both volume and scope, enabled by the rapid expansion of the Chinese 
economy at large and in keeping with PRC leadership’s goals for defense-industrial sector 
self-sufficiency. Figure 6 shows the decline in overall Chinese arms imports as the 
indigenization efforts continue to mature. 
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Figure 6. Russian Arms Exports to China, SIPRI Trend-Indicator 
Values (TIV) in Millions USD, 1992–201892 
 
C. ARMS TRADE PATTERNS 
1. Aircraft 
Although the extensive offsets make determining the financial details of Sino-
Russian arms transfers more difficult, it is clear that during the 1990s China’s main foreign 
source of military equipment was Russia, and that Chinese imports during this decade were 
aircraft-centric. SIPRI estimates the total value of Chinese arms imports between 1992 and 
1999 at approximately $7.8 billion in 1990 USD, with Russia providing nearly 80 percent 
of this value.93 (Transfers from other former Soviet Union states accounted for another 2.3 
percent; the remainder of Chinese imports originated in Western states or Israel.94) The 
arms trade reflected in part the upswing at all levels of bilateral trade between China and 
post-Soviet Russia, estimated at $8 billion in 1993.95 Likewise, while Beijing relied 
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heavily on Russian imports, Moscow depended on the Chinese market to float its defense 
industries. According to SIPRI data, sales to China accounted for twenty-five percent of 
the value of Russian arms exports between 1992 and 1999, while The Economist and The 
Financial Times reported in 1997 that about one third of Rosvooruzheniye’s current and 
near-term future revenues were of Chinese origin.96 
Throughout the 1990s, China imported primarily aircraft, associated missiles, and 
air defense systems from Russia, accounting for some seventy percent of its total arms 
transfers in 1997.97 Aircraft included relatively sophisticated airframes such as the fourth-
generation Su-27SK Flanker B fighter—which Moscow provided both directly, and in the 
form of kits for assembly in China with possible export to third parties.98  
2. Maritime Platforms 
By the latter half of the 1990s, Beijing’s national defense posture shifted from the 
land-centric counter-invasion strategy of the Cold War era to an offshore defense policy 
informed by maritime economic interests, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 
preeminence of the United States Navy.99 The Chinese defense-industrial sector of the 
1990s could mass produce lower-end systems, but lagged behind the established powers in 
more advanced research and development, especially in naval missions. The Jiang 
administration sought to plug capability gaps with Russian imports, prioritizing “quality 
over quantity” to establish a modern blue-water navy.100  
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) procured relatively sophisticated 
Russian ships and submarines to support the strategic shift, including the first of ten Kilo 
class attack submarines in 1995 and heavily armed Sovremennyy class destroyers starting 
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in 1999. Unlike the kit construction of contemporary aircraft and Soviet-designed Ming 
(Romeo) class submarines in the 1960s, the new orders were built or modified in Russia 
and delivered after sea trials to the PLAN. This type of procurement cycle possibly 
contributed to a slower pace of technology transfer to the Chinese defense-industrial sector 
in comparison to aviation and air defense systems. Nonetheless, importation of Russian 
naval platforms and the associated support personnel allowed Beijing to apply lessons 
learned to its domestic shipbuilding programs, like the concurrent Song class attack 
submarine project, which had languished in development despite assistance from other 
nations. It would later apply a similar technique to jumpstart the carrier program. As China 
entered for the twenty-first century, it laid the groundwork for a greater level of arms 
production self-sufficiency. 
The PLAN and PLAAF took delivery of eight more Project 636 (ASCM-capable) 
Kilo class submarines, two Sovremennyy destroyers, and dozens of Su-30MKK Flanker 
aircraft from 2004–2006 as part of a U.S. $4 billion deal with Moscow brokered in 2002.101 
China also purchased Soviet-era equipment from other former USSR states, including 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan and Belarus; several of these arrangements, however, were made with 
Russian mediation. Transfers involving new construction equipment (primarily aircraft and 
engines) from Western states were dwarfed by Sino-Russian arms trade levels but also 
peaked in the mid-2000s, averaging $355 million in value annually from 2004–2006.102 
Like Russian arms deals, they often stipulated that some production occur under license 
within China or resulted in copycat production in China.  
Despite its large surface and submarine fleets, however, China notably lacked a 
functional aircraft carrier—a robust power projection tool – until recent years. In 1998, the 
PLAN purchased a partially finished Kuznetsov class carrier from Ukraine to launch its 
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carrier program.103 The Navy has operated the rebranded Liaoning semi-experimentally 
since its 2012 commissioning while incorporating several minor modifications into its first 
indigenously designed aircraft carrier (Type 001A), which was launched in early 2017 and 
is expected to enter service by 2020.104 The new project is still based on the Kuznetsov 
class – its significance does not lie in revolutionary design features, but as proof of concept 
that the Chinese defense-industrial sector can produce a carrier independently. The ability 
to support an active aircraft carrier program and to produce a carrier indigenously entails a 
high level of operational and logistic maturity within the PLAN and Chinese defense 
sector, respectively. Chinese media have also noted the prestige of entering the carrier 
club.105  Thus the PLAN’s nascent aircraft carrier building program blends China’s classic 
incremental approach to weapons development with its more recent focus on rapid 
modernization, innovation and achieving major power status. 
Advancement of its shipbuilding programs signifies that Beijing is closing the naval 
technology gap that prompted many of the Soviet and Russian imports of previous decades. 
The Chinese defense sector now typically exports more ships than it imports from abroad. 
Between 2000 and 2007, exports of military ships from China averaged U.S. $47 million 
in value each year according to SIPRI estimates; since 2010, that average has increased to 
U.S. $390 million. The increase is attributable partly to the sale of second-hand combatants 
and patrol craft, and partly to new construction destined for export, such as Pakistan’s U.S. 
$4-5 billion order of eight Yuan class submarines in 2016.106  
3. Air Defense Systems 
Beijing has maintained interest in importing advanced Russian sensors and missile 
systems that are compatible with Russian-designed platforms already in use in China. In 
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2015, the two countries negotiated a U.S. $3 billion agreement to procure up to six S-400 
or SA-21 Growler systems in 2015, while Chinese and Russian developers likely 
collaborated on a modified AS-18 Kazoo anti-ship cruise missile designed for the Chinese 
variant of the Su-30 Flanker.107 
D. FORMAL AND INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Many details pertaining to the Sino-Russian defense relationship – particularly in 
contrast to the Indo-Russian defense relationship – are notoriously difficult to determine 
due to general lack of transparency within the Chinese military and DIS, as well as 
oversight of the media by the state. This section, therefore, is certainly not an exhaustive 
description of the accommodations made by the Russian government and supplier 
organizations in Sino-Russian arms deals. Nonetheless, it is clear that both states made a 
wide variety of arrangements over the decades to facilitate arms conventional arms 
transfers to China. 
1. Economic/Commercial Accommodations Made by Russia 
a. Offsets 
The Yeltsin administration, eager to find arms customers in the early 1990s and to 
satisfy domestic consumer demands, used several types of offsets in exchange for its arms 
exports to China. Chinese credit to Russia was estimated at $1.07 billion in October 1992, 
with arms sales expected to help close the gap.108  
b. Maintenance and Personnel Training 
In addition to permitting commodity imports as barter payment, Yeltsin’s 
government frequently incorporated pre-delivery refurbishment for secondhand systems, 
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post-delivery maintenance and parts support as elements of transfer deals. These measures 
indirectly affected the Chinese defense-industrial sector by providing a higher caliber of 
imports and providing a reliable, though limited, source of technical support in the persons 
of Russian maintenance personnel. Furthermore, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed 
in 2016 that over “3,600 Chinese officers” had been trained in Russia’s “military academies 
and training centers.”109 
2. Technological Accommodations Made by Russia  
a. Indigenous Production 
Although Russian officials in the mid-1990s claimed that “no transfer of 
technology” occurred, Moscow helped to inject technological expertise directly into the 
PLA and defense-industrial sector through indigenous production licenses.110 (Beijing was 
also willing to simply steal proprietary information; the Cox Report, published in the 
United States in 1999, found that Chinese agents had obtained sensitive information on 
ballistic missile and nuclear weapons design.111) Since 2010, importation of Russian 
equipment has occurred at a much lower rate than any time in the previous decade. The 
profile of Russian imports also more closely aligns with what China imports from other 
states, focused on transport aircraft, helicopters and engines; the ship- and submarine-
building windfall of the 1990s and 2000s, which overwhelmingly benefited Russian arms 
manufacturers, is over.  
b. Joint Weapons Development 
Russia did not undertake widely recognized joint research or development efforts 
with Chinese defense enterprises, although there has probably been some specialized 
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collaboration, i.e., modifications to the AS-18.112 Beijing has been willing to participate 
in targeted research projects with multiple other nations, although it is wary of fielding the 
results of such collaboration in its own military.113 Entering into research agreements 
without committing to deploying the results provides China a low-cost research boost, 
while helping to foster its reputation as a reliable business partner and “lead nation” for 
sharing military technology.114 The participation of state-owned enterprises in 
“transnational structures for technological … diffusion” in recent years has accelerated 
research and development across the civilian economy, with positive repercussions in dual-
use technologies for the defense-industrial sector.115 China has also become a major arms 
exporter in its own right. It overtook France in 2012 to become the world’s third-largest 
exporter (behind only the United States and Russia), and Chinese-built weapons systems 
have been sold to over forty countries in the last decade.116 
3. Overtly Political/Strategic Accommodations Made by Russia 
Bilateral Military Exercises: While China and Russia do not have any standing 
treaties or declarations of friendship, the two nations do share an extensive land and sea 
border and have multiple opportunities for multilateral cooperation. China has hosted a 
series of multilateral exercises known as PEACE MISSION since 2005, with a naval 
element since 2012.117 Russia was the first foreign partner involved in PEACE MISSION, 
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though other nations have since joined as well.118 Chinese forces recently participated in 
VOSTOK 2018, a massive Russian joint exercise.119 
E. OUTLOOK 
In the Cold War era, the arms trade functioned as an element of China’s hedging 
strategy and pursuit of a multipolar world power structure—a means of ensuring the nation 
would never endure another century of humiliation, while keeping both the Soviet Union 
and the West at arm’s length, unlike its Korean and Japanese neighbors. In the decades 
following the Cold War, Russian arms manufacturers supplied a convenient way for China 
to reap the benefits of revising its security policies and modernizing its military forces, 
despite lacking the indigenous capacity to do so at the desired rate. From Moscow’s 
perspective, arms transfers provided the Russian economy a critical injection of monetary 
income and consumer goods, albeit at an opportunity cost.  
Under Walt’s framework for alliance formation, states align with outside entities to 
balance a perceived threat.120 However, states might also attempt to neutralize external 
threats through internal reforms, such as military buildup. Measures taken to increase one’s 
own soft power vis-à-vis a potential threat state could also be interpreted as a form of 
balancing behavior under Walt’s framework. China has undertaken multiple kinds of 
balancing acts. Leadership in Beijing surely interpret the United States as the greatest 
kinetic threat to China’s ascension as a global power. With the world’s most powerful 
military and a robust forward presence, the American armed forces are better equipped 
than any other nation’s to counter Chinese territorial expansion or incursions in Taiwan. 
Much of Chinese twenty-first century military policy has focused on building a forward 
presence of its own as well as implementing anti-access and area denial strategies, which 
are particularly potent against archetypal American force structures (like carrier strike 
groups) that still depend on mobile air power and unhindered lines of communication. Just 
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as importantly, however, Beijing has attempted to increase Chinese influence on the world 
stage through a variety of soft power measures ranging from international trade to 
infrastructure projects in developing nations. 
Today, China is most invested in fueling its own geopolitical ascent through 
economic relations with its Western trading partners, especially the United States. Sino-
Russian trade remains anemic by comparison, although this is restricted by the Russian 
rather than the Chinese economy.121 Beijing has a vested interest, however, in maintaining 
regional stability by staying on good terms with its northern neighbors. Chinese leadership 
have often taken opportunities to demonstrate the independence of their interests from 
those of the West, sometimes by signaling warmer relations with Russia.122 As the two 
physically largest countries in Asia, China and Russia will inevitably have several avenues 
for cooperation on common security problems, including their extensive shared border and 
separatist movements in central Asian provinces. Continued arms transfers could signal 
willingness to collaborate in the security field beyond these obvious opportunities, as could 
measures such as bilateral military exercises emphasizing integrated operations – which 
China and Russia have already undertaken. 
In the future, the threat of a politically non-aligned, economically and militarily 
ascendant China may alarm Russian leadership too much to perpetuate the arms trade 
relationship despite the economic benefits of doing so, particularly if Beijing’s and 
Moscow’s strategic interests are at odds. Some Russian general staff officers and civilian 
officials have raised concerns.123 Conversely, the Chinese defense sector has become less 
dependent on Russian participation than it was in the 1950s through early 2000s. As this 
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“techno-nationalist state” continues its quest for “defense-industrial self-sufficiency,” 
China may be able to leverage Russian arms imports as a bargaining chip to extract 
favorable trade or political promises from Moscow.124 In light of the patterns of weapons 
development in the Chinese defense sector discussed above, however, it is unlikely that 
Chinese arms manufacturers will be able to supply the kind of creative thought or 
revolutionary advancement that would completely obsolesce Beijing’s reliance on arms 
imports despite the aspirations of the ruling cadres. Limited, narrow-scope relationships 
with a variety of suppliers seems the most likely course for the future of Chinese arms 
transfers. 
It is also unlikely that China’s situation as a rising world power with distant-seas 
ambitions will be replicated in the next several decades – meaning that the pattern of Sino-
Russian arms transfers does not provide a good example for predicting future Russian arms 
customers. The other major power in Asia, India, also has an extensive history of military 
cooperation with Russia, but there are significant differences between Delhi’s and 
Beijing’s development of their defense-industrial sectors. These differences are covered in 
Chapter IV. 
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IV. INDIA CASE STUDY 
A. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
As another rising power with a large population, growing economy and energy 
dependence on Russia and the Middle East, India has now become Russia’s most robust 
export market.125 New Delhi frequently favors non-alignment with respect to major world 
powers, pursuing a policy of “interest-based bilateralism,” although its relations with 
Moscow have been cordial since well before the 1971 treaty of friendship.126 India’s 
position along crucial Indian Ocean trade routes is potentially troubling to a China 
increasingly dependent on foreign commerce, and the Chinese military buildup has been 
viewed with concern in New Delhi. Additionally, India has been driven closer to Russia 
due to the U.S.-Pakistan partnership during the Global War on Terror, although American 
diplomats were careful to hedge support for Islamabad due to its more controversial 
activities.127 
This chapter concludes that Indian arms transfers from Russia have been motivated 
foremost by sheer industrial necessity, but are also strongly influenced by a desire to 
maintain political goodwill. China's rise in the Indo-Pacific is the primary driver of both. 
Like China, India has undertaken ambitious military modernization programs to include an 
indigenous aircraft carrier program, but the Indian defense industry has been plagued with 
sluggish indigenous acquisition and production processes as well as interdepartmental 
budgetary disputes.128 China’s buildup places additional pressure on India’s chances of 
catching up versus obsolescing militarily. Russia thus remains a favored arms trade partner 
out of practical as well as political reasons. Cooperation with Russia takes the form of 
imports, ranging from short-range missile systems to the lease of one Akula-class nuclear 
attack submarine; licensed Indian production of Russian designs like the Su-30MK and Su-
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30MKI Flanker variants; and joint development projects like the BrahMos anti-ship cruise 
missile.129 The Russian and Indian navies also participate in an annual to biannual exercise 
known as INDRA.130  
Collaboration along similar lines will likely remain high as the Indian economy 
booms and China continues to develop militarily in eastern Asia. According to SIPRI 
estimates, Russian arms exports to India have generally increased in volume over the last 
15 years, averaging U.S. $1.3 billion annually during the 2000–2005 period and growing 
to an average of U.S. $2.75 billion in 2010–2015.131 Outside these limited lines of 
cooperation, however, Moscow and New Delhi have relatively weak institutional and 
economic ties to cement their 2000 declaration of strategic partnership.132 India is also 
seeking to become an arms exporter in its own right. Success in this field implies that the 
defense-industrial sector has the capacity to produce most or all of the components; thus, 
increased exports will likely coincide with less reliance on foreign arms suppliers, and 
fewer transfers from Russia. 
B. SUMMARY OF POLITICAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS 
1. The Cold War: Military-Technical Cooperation…and Dependence 
After the end of British rule and the acrimonious partition of India and Pakistan in 
1947, the Nehru administration implemented a policy of non-alignment with the 
superpowers of the Cold War. Non-alignment has been marked by the desire on India’s 
part to balance its location as a bridge between Europe and Asia, its border conflicts with 
neighboring nations, its institutional similarities to the West, and its overlapping energy 
and security interests with those of other powers in Asia.133 This philosophy has remained 
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in Indian political thought through the present to varying degrees of prominence with 
respect to the Soviet Union, the successor state of Russia and the United States.  
Starting as soon as the 1950s, geostrategic conflicts between India and China—
sharing over two thousand miles of land border—emerged, eventually erupting into the 
Sino-Indian War in 1962. Concurrently, Moscow made friendly overtures to the Nehru 
administration after the Sino-Soviet split of 1960, while India had come to view the United 
States as an “unreliable partner” vis-à-vis security issues due to the establishment of 
American diplomatic and military relations with Pakistan almost immediately after 
independence.134 These threat factors, combined with New Delhi’s interests in 
emphasizing its own independence from Great Britain and its struggle to establish trade 
ties with the nascent European Community, drove India toward a productive defense-
oriented relationship with the Soviet Union during the early Cold War period.135  
The two nations began a military-technical cooperation agreement in 1962, and 
followed up in 1971 with the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Co-operation. 
The non-aligned state, ironically, became dependent almost exclusively on Soviet arms 
imports to supply its military.136 According to SIPRI, India was the single greatest 
recipient of both Soviet and global arms trade during the Cold War, accounting for nine 
percent of the USSR’s overall arms export activity, including transfers to other Warsaw 
Trade Organization states.137 Since 1991, Indian and Russian interests with respect to 
energy and security in central Asia remain aligned at their best, and are not mutually 
exclusive at their worst. New Delhi and Moscow have continued to define their strategic 
partnership along these principle lines into the twenty-first century.138 
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2. The 1990s to Present: New Growth after the Economic Crisis 
The USSR’s collapse coincided with a period of decreased Indo-Russian defense 
relations. Russia looked inward as it struggled to democratize and de-escalate with the 
West, and several erstwhile regional powers sought opportunities to become major world 
players under a new multipolar world order. Beginning in 1991, Indian Prime Minister 
Rao’s administration sought to bring the Indian state back from the brink of bankruptcy by 
implementing sweeping liberal market reforms, resulting in rapid economic growth.139 
Nonetheless, Indo-Russian military and technical cooperation endured as the keystone of 
the new bilateral relationship. During a 1993 state visit to India, officials of the Yeltsin and 
Rao administrations reaffirmed the 1971 friendship treaty (though in feebler form) as well 
as their commitment to transfer dual-use rocket technology from Russia to India, which 
had prompted a two-year U.S. ban on sales of sensitive technology to either nation the year 
prior.140  
The average volume of Russian arms transfers to India during the five years 
immediately following the Cold War fell by seventy-five percent from the 1987–1991 
average of nearly U.S. $2.5 billion.141 This reflected an overall halving of arms imports 
by India during this period from all suppliers, due in large part to restrictions put on Delhi’s 
purchasing power following the 1991 economic crisis, as well as a slight relative drop in 
imports sourced from Russia and other former Soviet states, whose defense manufacturers 
were undergoing crises of their own.142 Arms transfers to India remained low through the 
following decade, reaching late 1980s levels in 2003 but not exceeding them until 2010, as 
the extensive arms sales deals whose groundwork was laid in the mid-2000s came to 
fruition.143 Figure 7 shows this growth. Explosive economic growth in India during this 
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period—gross domestic product (GDP) roughly doubled between 2000 and 2010 after 
adjusting for inflation—enabled similar budgetary increases for the Ministry of Defense, 
even though military expenditures as a portion of GDP declined slightly during this 
period.144  
Figure 7. Russian Arms Exports to India, SIPRI Trend-Indicator 
Values (TIV) in Millions USD, 1992–2018145 
 
India’s relationship with the United States was strained during the Clinton years 
due to the nuclear issue.146 The George W. Bush administration, however, struck “a more 
pragmatic and measured” tone regarding Indian nuclear capabilities, criticized elements of 
Pakistan’s conduct during the global war on terror, and began to give serious consideration 
to counterbalancing Chinese power in Asia as the afterglow of the post-Soviet peace 
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dividend faded.147 Consequently, New Delhi and Washington enjoyed a rapprochement 
early in the 2000s, resulting in gradual resumption of arms sales from the United States to 
India.148 The United States soon became a major supplier of military equipment to 
India.149 The improved relationship also produced an upswing in bilateral military 
exercises and deliberate coordination in “such matters of common interest as terrorism, 
peacekeeping operations, the protection of sea lanes, and piracy.”150 Better standing with 
the United States, however, did not seriously damage India’s relationship with Russia. In 
2000, Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee and President Vladimir Putin signed a declaration of 
“strategic partnership” and promised increased cooperation on “political, economic, trade, 
scientific, technological, cultural, and other” matters.151 The two nations have held annual 
joint summits and conducted multiple official visits since then. 
C. ARMS TRADE PATTERNS 
Since the late Cold War era, India has been one of the largest single recipients of 
foreign-built or -designed weapons systems transfers. The country is a well-rounded 
customer that has imported, leased or licensed platforms intended for every major field of 
warfare.152 Within this overall robust arms transfer regimen, the military invested 
particularly in air and maritime platforms during post-Cold War modernization efforts. 
This was in direct pursuit of India’s broadening strategic interests in these domains, though 
also a side effect of the digital revolution.   
The greatest part of India’s overall military expenditure still goes to its land forces 
as seen in Figure 8; within the land forces, over half of all costs were characterized as 
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“personnel” expenditures in self-reporting to the UN.153 Modernization efforts undertaken 
by the IA cannot ignore this financial reality, which will likely have a major impact on 
equipment obsolescence in coming decades. Although the Navy and Air Force control 
much smaller budgets than the Army, they are not burdened with massive standing forces 
and have invested heavily in buying and building new equipment, with 59%-80% of 
reported yearly outlays funding procurement and construction.154  
Figure 8. Indian Military Expenditures and Allocations by Service 
(Self-report to UN)155 
 
This figure illustrates the differences among resource allocation across force types. The first column for 
each year entry provides a comparison of overall military expenditures by force type. This includes 
expenditures for personnel, operations and maintenance (O&M), procurement and construction (P&C), 
R&D, and miscellaneous costs. The second column for the year compares only procurement and 
construction expenditures. NOTE: the FY 2010 land forces’ P&C expenditure is an estimate, as the 2010 
report combined it with operations expenses. I derived the estimate by averaging the ratios of land force 
P&C to O&M expenditures from other years, then applying the ratio to the combined 2010 figure. 
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1. Aircraft 
India has invested heavily in updating and expanding its aircraft inventories, both 
as a component of the overall modernization efforts and as part of New Delhi’s specific 
response to Chinese expansionism, which manifests most clearly in the maritime domain. 
In particular, the Ministry of Defense has spent billions on acquiring naval aviation 
platforms centered on developing its general maritime patrol capability (for both the Navy 
and Coast Guard), enhancing its anti-submarine warfare capacity, and establishing a 
carrier-based fixed wing force.  Such maritime expansion, however, is in addition to 
modernizing the existing IAF fleet with expensive fourth- and fifth-generation fighter 
aircraft. Moreover, Indian efforts to fully indigenize military aircraft procurement have met 
with severe setbacks, as exemplified by the troubled development of the Tejas fighter, and 
are still dependent in many cases on licensed production or expensive imported avionics 
and sensor suites. The overall numbers of aircraft involved in these efforts and the desire 
to develop new capabilities or enhance existing ones, combined with production problems, 
together have increased reliance on foreign suppliers for aircraft acquisition. 
Acquisition of aircraft and associated subsystems consistently comprised the 
plurality of all of India’s arms transfers after 1991, and for the last decade an outright 
majority as tabulated by SIPRI trend-indicator values.156 Aircraft and associated onboard 
systems were typically built or ordered in multiples of ten, while compatible weapons such 
as air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles were typically ordered by the hundreds, contributing 
to the high overall values.157 While Russia remains the foremost supplier for air-to-air 
fighter craft and carrier-based platforms, the United States has achieved preferred status in 
the anti-submarine warfare realm with the P-8 Poseidon (earlier P-3 Orion) over legacy 
German- and Soviet-manufactured maritime patrol craft, and French aerospace firm 
Dassault continues a boutique relationship with the IAF.158 
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Russia is India’s only viable foreign supplier for certain vital military platforms, 
such as fighter aircraft that are compatible with the Indian Navy’s two fixed-wing aircraft 
carriers, both of which feature a ski-jump ramp rather than powered catapults with a flat 
deck for launching planes. The indigenously designed Tejas combat aircraft—designed to 
phase-replace the aging Russian-designed MiG-21 Fishbed and British-designed Sea 
Harrier, and currently operated by the Indian Air Force alongside a variety of foreign-built 
aircraft—was plagued by decades of development delays and ultimately deemed too heavy 
for carrier operations following tests in 2016.159 This leaves the Russian MiG-29K and 
MiG-29KUB Fulcrum variants as the Indian Navy’s best options for maintaining its sea-
based fighter capability as of 2018—indeed the IAF and IN were already operating dozens 
of MiG-29 airframes during the delivery of the first Tejas fighter, making further 
acquisitions a convenient decision for the Ministry of Defense.160 
2. Tanks, Armored Vehicles and Field Weapons 
With over a million members and active border disputes, India’s Army is the 
dominant branch of its military. New Delhi has invested extensively in upgrading land 
warfare systems over the past three decades, although more of the army’s expenditures go 
to maintaining the human force than equipment (at least since 2010).161 According to 
SIPRI data, acquisition of field weapons peaked in the 1990s, but has generally played 
second fiddle to aircraft acquisition in the twenty-first century.162 Armored vehicles and 
artillery comprised about fourteen percent of India’s total arms transfers since 1992.163 
Russia remains the principal supplier of these systems to India, and has also tried to corner 
the Indian market for modernization of Soviet-manufactured legacy systems.  
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The various processes by which the Indian Army built its inventory of T-90S and 
T-90MS Bhishma main battle tanks conveniently illustrate multiple facets of the Russo-
Indian arms trade relationship, as well as the indigenous production problems stymying the 
MoD’s ambitious force modernization plans. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the second-
generation Soviet T-72 MBT served as the IA’s primary armor platform, with an inventory 
of approximately 2,400 vehicles.164 But the vehicles themselves were aging; moreover, 
they were obsolescing, as Pakistan fielded the more modern (third-generation Soviet 
baseline) Ukrainian-built T-80UD MBT beginning in 1997.165 In 2001, New Delhi 
concluded a U.S. $600-$700 million agreement with Moscow for over three hundred state-
of-the-art T-90S tanks.166 Over half of the sum was paid up front.167 The transfer was to 
consist of both finished units and kits for assembly in India, to be deployed instead of the 
indigenous Arjun tank project—which had languished in various stages of production hell 
since the 1970s—as the phased replacement for the Army’s workhorse tank, the Soviet-
built T-72.168 The European-designed components were beset with technical problems in 
the Indian climate.169 Nonetheless, in 2006 the Ministry of Defense tapped the state-owned 
Heavy Vehicles Factory (HVF) to produce a thousand additional T-90S tanks under license 
from Russia, as the Arjun would “not be procured in the large quantities originally 
imagined” despite finally entering production.170 As of 2019, however, New Delhi 
authorized a U.S. $1.93 billion dollar plan with Rosoboronexport to order over 400 
additional advanced T-90MS units, to be constructed mostly in Russia by Uralvagonzavod 
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to compensate for delayed production at home.171 Army statements surrounding the deal 
cited dissatisfaction with the pace of HVF output: 
acquisition of the T-90MS MBTs has become necessary following the ‘slow 
pace’ at which HVF has been licence-building the 1,000 T-90S MBTs… 
[that] it had contracted in 2006–07 to complete by 2020. So far, the HVF 
has licence-built merely 350–400 units.172 
Despite the growing inventory of modern T-90 and Arjun tanks, the T-72 remains 
the Army’s workhorse, with about 1,400 MBTs and 500 support variant vehicles in service 
as of 2019 (though many are likely non-operational).173 In the early 2000s, acquisition of 
the T-90S competed with the need to modernize the obsolescing T-72. Rosoboronexport 
offered both to supply the new tanks and upgrade the old ones, but “lost a lever” upon 
successful completion of its initial T-90S delivery in 2003.174 After diverting funds for 
several years toward accelerated acquisition of the new tank, India ultimately turned to a 
Polish contractor to provide electronics and sensor upgrades to a portion of the T-72 
inventory, at a cost of 2002 U.S. $73 million and with no local production authorized.175 
The Army later entertained plans to procure 1,000 upgraded engines from a Polish supplier 
as well, before opting to earmark approximately U.S. $313 million to manufacture the 
engines in India.176 
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3. Maritime Platforms 
Although airborne systems comprised the majority of Indian arms imports since 
1992, naval systems also consumed a significant portion of the defense acquisitions budget. 
Ship acquisition (sans additional shipborne sensors, engines and weapons) comprised 
about twelve percent of total arms transfers to India since 1992, according to SIPRI.177 
Acquisition of entire naval combatants differs from aircraft and terrestrial systems in 
several fundamental aspects. Platforms are relatively large, few, and expensive to maintain; 
as such, they are typically built to perform a variety of missions and to accommodate major 
upgrades as they age. The extended construction process of a ship or submarine provides 
multiple opportunities for customization and integration of foreign designs with domestic 
facilities—whether that entails bow-to-stern licensed production, technical assistance from 
foreign engineers, integration of foreign-built weapons and sensors onto a locally built hull, 
or simply the delivery of a complete platform. India has explored many of these options 
during recent decades in its acquisition of Russian-built and -designed naval combatants.  
The Indian Navy’s ten Kilo-class attack submarines were built in and delivered 
from St. Petersburg shipyards, some as new constructions and others as refurbished units. 
Similarly, the IN’s Kiev-class aircraft carrier was modernized in Severodvinsk after service 
in the Russian Navy, and subsequently accepted in 2013 as the INS Vikramaditya.178 The 
carrier probably could not have been modernized at the time in Indian Navy facilities, 
which lacked a suitable drydock until 2019.179 
The nominally straightforward process of commissioning whole platforms from 
Russia was often motivated by problems with India’s domestic production of similar units, 
but has itself been beset by delays and cost overruns in Russian shipyards. Delivery of all 
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six original Talwar-class frigates from Russia, for example, also occurred behind 
schedule.180 Also, the cost of Vikramaditya’s modernization ballooned to three times 
higher and finished five years later than initially contracted.181 Second-order effects of this 
delay included refitting the IN’s only other carrier, the half-century-old British-built INS 
Viraat, to continue service several years past its originally planned retirement. Once 
acquired, however, the technology transfer associated with acquisition of the new platform 
provided the Indian Navy with an excellent example for building and operating its own 
aircraft carrier – INS Vikrant, which is expected to begin sea trials in 2020.182  
Planned upgrades to Russian-built platforms were also subject to problems, but 
leveraging foreign shipyards remains the most viable way for the Indian Navy to complete 
major naval projects while minimizing delays. A 2001 contract to upgrade the IN’s Kilo-
class submarine fleet to support advanced missiles from the Klub family, for example, 
turned sour in 2008 when the first such submarine to be retrofitted failed its missile test 
firing battery.183 Navy leadership tapped Russia’s Zvezdochka Shipyard again in 2016 to 
handle mid-life extension maintenance for one of the IN’s Kilo-class submarine fleet, with 
the remaining three ships in the group contracted to Indian firm Larsen and Toubro, at a 
total cost of some U.S. $747 million.184 Russian engineering consultants were involved in 
the certification of L&T’s privately owned shipyard near Chennai as the facility most 
“technically capable” of supporting the refit processes and timelines required.185 The Kilo 
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mid-life extension process itself had become necessary largely because of a six-year delay 
around production of Scorpène-class attack submarines in Mumbai.186  
Indian shipyards have undertaken licensed production of Russian-designed naval 
units, most recently the follow-on Talwar-class guided missile frigate (Project 11356), for 
use by the Navy.187 However, the two ships to be built in India “are expected to cost 30–
50% more than the direct Russian import [of two additional ships] due to the cost of 
building infrastructure and transfer of technology.” 188 Prior to Talwar, three Shivalik-class 
guided missile frigates (Project 17) were produced in India as hybrids of indigenous labor 
and imported Russian sensors and weapons.189 Russian and Indian engineers collaborated 
on development of the BrahMos anti-ship cruise missile—billed as a joint project, although 
the design drew heavily from Russia’s SS-N-26 Strobile missile.190 
India also relied on Russian suppliers for critical components of the Navy’s 
nominally indigenous shipbuilding projects. Obtaining warship-grade steel was a “primary 
hurdle” in the construction of both the indigenous Kolkata-class destroyer (Project 15A) 
and the Shivalik frigates. Lack of availability from Russian suppliers contributed heavily 
to cost overruns of over 200 percent for the project, prompting Delhi to urge Indian metals 
manufacturers to enter the defense sector.191  
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4. Air Defense and Missile Systems 
In a 2018 deal costing some U.S. $5.4 billion, Moscow agreed to furnish the Indian 
Air Force with five S-400 Triumf (NATO reporting name SA-21 Growler) air defense 
systems, for delivery between 2020–2025.192 The sophisticated S-400 is a popular high-
end system on the weapons export circuit as well as in Russia, where it has been in use 
since 2007.193 The fact that the Russian-built system would also be far less costly than 
procuring comparable United States-built systems like THAAD—reportedly offered at a 
cost of U.S. $3 billion per unit in response to the S-400 agreement—was probably also a 
point in favor of the S-400.194 
The success of the BrahMos naval cruise missile program has spurred further 
cooperation between India’s DRDO and Russia’s NPOM, which have developed a ship-
launched LACM variant of the BrahMos as of May 2019, as well as lighter air-launched 
variants designed to be carried by the Su-30MKI Flanker fighter aircraft.195 Plans exist to 
continue collaboration on more advanced versions of these systems.196 The joint project is 
also an example of successful Indian indigenization of its supply chain, with “more than 
70% of the missile components … [and] 100% of ground support equipment for the 
weapon complex” being manufactured in India in 2019, to include metallic parts subjected 
to high stress levels.197 The BrahMos’s development from a Russian baseline into evolved, 
specialized forms that are increasingly “made in India”—and that can be marketed as 
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Indian exports—marks a high point in the Russo-Indian military-technical cooperative 
relationship. 
D. FORMAL AND INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS 
Indo-Russian arms transfer activity spans a wide spectrum of interaction types. 
Essentially any category of deal that supplier and recipient states might undertake, Delhi 
and Moscow have undertaken. 
1. Economic/Commercial Accommodations Made by Russia 
a. Payment Changes (Cash, Commodities, etc.) 
Russia has been willing to grant considerable payment accommodations for its 
largest single customer. In the 1990s—shortly after the Indian financial crisis—Moscow 
and Delhi arranged for a direct ruble-rupee conversion applying to defense procurement 
deals.198 The move benefited both parties, as the Indian government was able to bypass 
the extra expenses of conversion through world currency, while Russian defense 
companies secured another major source of income. Since the invasion of Crimea, 
sanctions targeting Russia have also affected arms transfers. The latest Talwar deal, inked 
in 2018, again allowed payment by direct conversion between rupees and rubles – this time 
to bypass American financial sanctions against Moscow.199 
b. Offsets 
Industrial offsets are a common demand from countries seeking to establish their 
own arms manufacturing capability, and India is no exception.200 Licensed production and 
formal technology transfer were major offset categories in Russian arms transfers to India. 
The Ministry of Defense has imposed mandatory offsets since 2004 for all arms transfer 
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deals over a set value, although that value has increased over time.201 In 2011, the Indian 
Ministry of Defense threatened to increase offset requirements in future arms transfer 
agreements with Russia, the immediate cause being an attempt by Rosoboronexport to 
credit the granting of technical designs for the MiG-29 toward the offset requirement baked 
into a $960 million dollar contract to upgrade the airframe, currently in use by the IAF and 
IN.202 
c. Maintenance and Personnel Training 
Russia also frequently agreed to provide maintenance and personnel training as part 
of major arms transfers to India. The 2011 MiG-29 upgrade contract, for example, included 
“detailed plans for setting up simulator-based training centers, service depots, and 
maintenance centers for aircraft and radar systems.”203 Russia also provided training for 
the Indian Navy crews operating the imported Akula class nuclear-powered submarine.204 
In some cases, the training and maintenance elements of an arms transfer agreement are 
most noticeable when they go awry—such as when replacement parts are delayed in 
Russia, incentivizing alternate procurement methods. A memorandum of understanding 
signed in August 2017 between Indian military transport firm Ashok Leyland Defense 
Systems and Rosoboronexport permitted Indian production and “life cycle support” of 
Russian designs for armored vehicles and tanks.205 Such memoranda have enabled greater 
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autonomy for India for the initial arms production process and, perhaps even more 
importantly, follow-on maintenance and sustainment cycles. 
2. Technology Accommodations Made by Russia 
a. Indigenous Production 
The Russian government was typically willing to entertain a range of indigenous 
production options when negotiating transfer deals with India. The MoD has funded 
multiple licensed production lines and import substitution efforts since 1991. Prime 
Minister Modi’s “make in India” initiative, officially launched in 2014, is a cluster of 
government programs designed to strengthen the Indian economy through foreign direct 
investment and industrial diversification.206 The initiative manifested in the MoD’s 2016 
Defense Procurement Procedure as several reforms designed to incentivize local 
production.207 The Make in India mentality has had major ramifications for the arms trade 
business in India, since foreign partners who wish to secure major transfer deals with the 
world’s largest arms importer must take into account Delhi’s insistence on indigenization 
of multiple components. Russia is an accommodating partner in these efforts, consenting 
to:  
1. Construction of entire units using Indian materials in Indian facilities via 
licensed production, e.g., the advanced Talwar-class frigate.208 This is 
probably a mutually optimal situation for both states, since the 
administration in Delhi is willing to pay a premium for the necessary 
technology transfer and opportunities to build India’s industrial base. 
Rosoboronexport, on the other hand, likely prizes opportunities for profit 
with relatively low space, labor and time commitments. 
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2. Construction or assembly in Indian facilities using a mix of Russian and 
Indian manufactured components, e.g., the Shivalik-class frigates. 
3. Delivery of kits for assembly in India, e.g., T-72 and some T-90S 
tanks.209 
4. Delivery of entire units, e.g. Kilo-class attack submarines, with follow-on 
modifications performed in India with Russian advisory assistance.210 
b. Lease and Upgrade Contracts 
The IN’s Akula-class attack submarine was leased from Russia in 2012 and will 
likely be renewed at the end of the ten-year lease, with a second hull requested for delivery 
by 2025.211 Prior to the transfer of the first Akula, a Charlie-class submarine on lease from 
the Soviet Union filled a similar role from 1987–1991.212 Lease of these nuclear-powered 
platforms is doubtlessly educational for the Navy, since the rest of the fleet (other than the 
Arihant SSBN, which began development in the 1990s and was not commissioned until 
2016) is conventionally powered. 
c. Joint Weapons Development 
Russia is the favored but not sole partner in India’s joint weapons development 
efforts. The BrahMos project remains one of the most successful examples of multilateral 
collaboration between India and Russia. However, the failed multirole transport aircraft 
(MTA) and fifth generation fighter aircraft (FGFA) projects undertaken by Hindustan 
Aeronautics Limited and United Aircraft Corporation show that the Russo-Indian joint 
development relationship was not always fruitful. Citing intractable disagreements over 
                                                 
209 Jane’s by IHS Markit, “India to Buy Russian T-90S MBTs.” 
210 Rahul Bedi, “L&T Shortlisted for ‘Kilo’ Upgrade Work,” Jane’s by IHS Markit, January 13, 2016, 
https://janes-ihs-com.libproxy.nps.edu/DefenseWeekly/Display/jdw60743-jdw-2016. 
211 “India Signs Pact with Russia on Chakra-3 Attack Submarine,” Economic Times, March 8, 2019, 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defense/india-signs-pact-with-russia-on-chakra-3-attack-
submarine/articleshow/68307218.cms. 
212 “Akula (Schuka-B Class),” Jane’s by IHS Markit, May 23, 2019, https://janes-ihs-
com.libproxy.nps.edu/Janes/Display/jfs_b064-jfs. 
 64 
engine design, Russian officials announced the termination of the MTA’s status as a joint 
project in 2016.213 For the senior development partner Russia, the airframe is expected to 
debut as the Il-276 in the 2020s, but it remains unclear how junior partner India will recoup 
the hundreds of millions of dollars invested or fill the gaps in its aging transport fleet.214 
In 2018, Indian officials withdrew from the slow-moving FGFA program, noting that 
continued development of the aircraft (based on the state-of-the-art Su-57 Felon) “would 
commit a large proportion of the IAF’s finances to a foreign developmental programme at 
a juncture when it desperately needed to indigenise and modernise.”215  
In addition to cooperation with Russian partners, India has undertaken a joint SAM 
venture with Israel, although the scale of the program is relatively small.216 The MoD also 
aims to produce advanced diesel submarines (Project 75I) through collaboration with an 
as-yet unidentified partner; Russian, French, German and Swedish vendors have been 
feted, but the project will likely suffer from delays similar to the IN’s other submarine 
procurement and modernization efforts if it is finalized.217 
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3. Overtly Political/Strategic Accommodations Made by Russia 
a. Treaties and Declarations 
India and the Soviet Union implemented a military-technical cooperation 
agreement in 1962 and a treaty of friendship in 1971. The Russian successor state and India 
still honor both, and have renewed the declarations several times.218  
b. Bilateral Military Cooperation 
The two countries regularly participate in a joint naval exercise known as INDRA 
NAVY, taking place near either Indian or Russian waters and conducted to “strengthen 
mutual confidence and inter-operability” while reinforcing the standing “bond of 
friendship between the countries.”219 While they do not share any land or sea borders and 
thus have few other opportunities for direct cooperation, New Delhi and Moscow do have 
common interest in Afghanistan’s security prospects, in central Asian security writ large 
due to its implications for energy futures, and overlapping security aims with respect to 
containing China.  
E. VOLUME AND TRENDS 
Taking advantage of New Delhi’s non-aligned status, the Indian defense sector 
keeps a diverse portfolio of international arms transfer partners. As a percentage of value 
of all arms imports to India, Russian sources have fluctuated and the clearest trend seems 
to be that Russian imports comprised from fifty to eighty percent of the overall value of 
arms imports in a given year.220 The volume of importation has increased greatly since 
1990, however, expanding from U.S. $1.1 billion annually during the 1992–1999 period to 
an average of U.S. $3.8 billion in 2010–2015—comparable to arms transfer rates in the late 
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1980s and reflecting the state’s overall efforts to modernize its armed forces as India climbs 
the rungs of the world power ladder.221 
The government would like to see the Indian DIS become more self-reliant. Such 
is one of the goals of movements like Prime Minister Modi’s “Make in India” initiative.222 
However, the acquisition requirements of the Ministry of Defense have expanded at a faster 
rate than fully indigenous production lines can match. Domestic production and roll-out of 
new platforms frequently sputtered. The HAL Tejas, for example, is India’s first from-the-
ground-up native fighter plane, designed by Hindustan Aeronautics. The first of multiple 
planned variants has reached IOC in the IAF, but there was also to be a carrier variant 
compatible with the Vikrant class carrier.223 However, the airframe is too heavy to be 
compatible with Vikrant-class or Vikramaditya carrier operations, and was rejected by the 
Navy, necessitating acquisition of foreign airframe to replace the aging Sea Harrier fleet of 
the Vikrant (I) days.224 In a similar vein, India’s only indigenously built SSBN, Arihant, 
was out of commission for much of 2016 due to equipment problems caused by negligent 
water entry. Therefore, deltas are made up with outright imports and the intermediate step 
of licensed production.  
India’s dependence on foreign arms transfers creates a degree of path dependency. 
Existing equipment is more compatible with follow-on versions from the same producers, 
and less crew training is required to make the transition. Therefore, India has become a 
repeat customer for certain types of equipment from particular suppliers. While the Tejas 
languishes in development purgatory, the MiG-29 is the only airframe suitable for 
operations with INS Vikramaditya. Konstantin Makienko observes that “the MiG29K 
carrier-based version of the fighter has no competition in its niche on the world market. 
Currently this is the only horizontal takeoff fighter that can be deployed on aircraft carriers 
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without a catapult.”225 The phenomenon is not exclusive to Russian built systems; India’s 
procurement of the U.S.-built ASW aircraft P-3C Orion has been followed by the P-8I 
Poseidon. 
A subsidiary problem of path dependency arises when suppliers do not deliver as 
expected: any upstream problems are magnified for customer states waiting to both take 
initial delivery, and then secure the necessary follow-on technical support. This has led 
India, stung by cost overruns and contract fulfillment delays from Russian sources, to 
canvass former Soviet states and even third parties for compatible spare parts to some of 
its Russian-built and -licensed systems.226 
F. OUTLOOK 
The military-industrial component of India and Russia’s relationship has 
strengthened political and economic ties, and it is a major pillar of the overall strategic 
partnership. For Russia, India is the crucial arms market, accounting for most of the growth 
in exports between 2017 and 2018, and some thirty percent of total sales from year to 
year.227 Yet Russian dominance in the Indian arms trade will not last forever. India is 
slowly building its own arms production capabilities—even if claims like the Indian 
Navy’s that it has “transformed from a buyer’s Navy to builders [sic] Navy” are somewhat 
misleading.228 And New Delhi has diversified its arms supplier roster since the end of the 
Cold War: Israel, France, the United Kingdom and the United States are now significant 
players.229 Japan is also on the horizon.230 Moreover, Russian defense manufacturing 
firms have been fragile in the past, suffering from internal mismanagement, vulnerable to 
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boom-bust cycles depending on foreign sales, and falling behind on platform deliveries.231 
If Indian visions of indigenizing coalesce and the military becomes less reliant on Russian 
arms transfers, Rosoboronexport will need to find new sources of income or risk rising 
instability in the military-industrial sector. 
For India, Russia provided an accessible, affordable and familiar source of 
conventional armaments prior to the rapid growth of the Indian economy, which may have 
had positive opportunity benefit effects (i.e., provided a sense of security to government in 
New Delhi, permitting greater allocation of resources to other sectors). As Indian research 
and development capabilities expanded into the twenty-first century, New Delhi’s pre-
existing relationship with Moscow provided a convenient avenue for collaboration.232 
While the military-technical relationship between India and Russia has not translated so 
far into strong general bilateral trade, it is an important component of the Indo-Russian 
relationship per se. The drum-beaten strategic partnership is confined primarily to sectors 
controlled by the government and does not spill over into private arenas:  
Most of the areas of Russian-Indian cooperation—including military-
technical cooperation and energy—are dominated by government agencies 
and state-owned companies.… In areas where the government’s presence is 
less obvious or totally absent, examples of cooperation are few and far 
between.233 
Overall trade with Russia accounted for less than two percent of Indian trade in 
recent years, although Moscow supplied the majority of arms imports.234 As with Sino-
Russian trade, the small overall volumes are likely an effect of Russia’s commodities-
heavy export economy rather than an indicator of the political relationship between New 
Delhi and Moscow. In private commercial and cultural sectors, India prizes bilateral 
agreements and direct private sector cooperation with typically Western firms or 
institutions.235  
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Politically and economically, the diversified arms trade market of today gives the 
Kremlin less leverage than it would have if India were still as dependent on Russian-built 
systems as it was on the USSR in the Cold War era. Conversely, India is now in a better 
position to negotiate arms transfers on its own terms and turn down Russia’s (or any other 
country’s) bids if desired.236 In fact the MoD has modified its acquisitions policies in 
recent years to encourage growth away from foreign suppliers, even when doing so is more 
expensive.237 If Moscow were to seek a means of pressuring the Modi administration, 
leveraging India’s energy dependence on Russia would be more potent. India is a recent 
member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an energy-oriented group 
“dominated by Russia and China…[that] Russia sees…as a counterweight to Western 
alliances.”238  
Russia and India do not share any borders, have taken neutral stances with respect 
to each other’s territorial disputes, and India maintains a no-first-use nuclear policy. 
Neither country directly threatens the other. Therefore, it is unlikely that New Delhi and 
Moscow’s strategic goals will conflict over the next decade. Strategically, India is also 
balancing Chinese power in the area; under Walt’s threat balancing framework, this makes 
the regional political situation more stable, not less.239 If India can walk the line between 
good relations with Russia, good relations with the U.S., and not-too-adversarial relations 
with China, then the Indo-Pacific balance of power will likely remain fairly stable. 
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V. VIETNAM CASE STUDY 
A. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The Russian export market in Vietnam is growing as Vietnam modernizes its 
military in the twenty-first century. Hanoi has drastically increased the volume of its arms 
procurement—transfers increased from an annual average value of $114 million in 2000–
2005 to $660 million in 2010–2015.240 Moscow has “re-emerged as a privileged 
supporter,” dominating the Vietnamese arms market; Russian-made or -designed systems 
comprised 93 percent of all Vietnamese arms imports in 2015, although Hanoi is 
diversifying its defense sector with smaller recent contracts from Western suppliers.241  
The upswing in Vietnamese defense spending is mostly attributable to the 
ascendancy of China in southeastern Asia. Like India, Vietnam has specific border disputes 
with China—although Vietnam’s are maritime rather than terrestrial in nature, with 
overlapping claims to areas of the South China Sea. The South China Sea is of great 
economic interest to the surrounding states, and as such Vietnam is greatly interested in 
preserving its extensive claims in the area.242 There is also a legacy of bad blood between 
Vietnam and China regarding changes in control of the Paracel and Spratly island 
groups.243 Accordingly, Vietnam’s most notable military expenditures have revolved 
around modernizing its navy and coast guard. Unlike China and India, however, Vietnam 
lacks the population, placement and economy to become a major power. The power 
imbalance motivates Hanoi to counter Beijing’s influence by seeking closer ties with 
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regional and world powers whose interests do not directly threaten Vietnam’s territorial 
integrity.244 It is therefore a plum investment opportunity for multiple world powers. 
Jonathan Holslag notes that, in addition to contracting for “six Kilo-class 
submarines, 24 advanced Su-30MK2 maritime bombers and up to four Gepard frigates,” 
Moscow has also agreed to “build a new naval base, maintenance facilities and a 
telecommunications centre, and to provide training for Vietnamese navy officers.”245 
However, Moscow’s growing economic dependence on Beijing’s goodwill—a shift which 
Russian arms transfers to China indirectly contributed to—has alarmed officials in 
Hanoi.246 Thus, Vietnam has also increased dialogue and joint exercises with India, to 
include technical training, intelligence sharing, counterterrorism and jungle operations 
training.247 India stands a good chance of becoming the favored Asian partner in future 
Vietnamese defense strategy, given that the two nations share concerns over Chinese 
activity in the Indo-Pacific and that that befriending Vietnam will give India a convenient 
destination market for its own arms export ambitions. Hanoi even resumed military 
relations with the United States in 2005, a move met with “a lot of internal criticism.”248 
The administration has also made friendly overtures to Japan and South Korea.249 
Although the newer relationships with the United States and Japan have yet to produce 
results in the arms transfer arena, there have been discussions among all three states to do 
so.250 
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B. SUMMARY OF POLITICAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC 
INTERESTS  
1. The 1960s through 1980s: The Soviet Lifeline  
Vietnam was reliant on Soviet military aid during the Cold War, and by the 1990s 
most of its inventory originated in the USSR.251 While Vietnam was not a part of the 
Warsaw Treaty Organization, the struggle between communist and non-communist 
factions in a south Asian state straddling an important waterway kept both American and 
Soviet superpowers interested. According to SIPRI estimates, the Soviet Union provided 
on average ninety-three percent of annual arms transfers to Vietnam during the span of the 
Cold War, and at the height of the Vietnam War supplied over U.S. $900 million worth of 
materiel to North Vietnam and its allies each year.252 China was also a source of aid to 
North Vietnam during the 1960s; once reunified, though, Hanoi was embittered by 
Beijing’s refusal to cede control of the southern Paracel Islands, which had been seized by 
China in 1974.253 During the 1980s, Soviet arms transfers to aid Vietnam in the 
Cambodian conflict were achieved by naval blockade-running, and Soviet involvement 
may have deterred China from annexing the Spratly Islands as it did the Paracel Islands.254 
Military aid to North Vietnam during the Vietnam War, unsurprisingly, sought to 
counter American air power in particular. SIPRI estimates that about thirty percent of the 
total value of its arms receipts between 1965–1974 were air defense systems 
(predominantly mid-range SA-2 Guideline variants); missiles and aircraft comprised 
another nineteen and eleven percent, respectively.255 The USSR and China also provided 
thousands of tanks and armored vehicles, accounting for another nineteen percent (by 
estimated value) of weapons transfers to the communist state.256  
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As the 1980s arrived Vietnamese arms receipts became more aircraft-focused; 
helicopters and planes (mostly MiG-21 and Su-22 fighters) accounted for over half of all 
weapons imports in 1980–1984.257 Gorbachev’s perestroika ended Soviet aid to Vietnam 
in the latter half of the decade.258 The equipment being military aid, transfers to Vietnam 
were often second-hand equipment from the supplier state; what, if any, additional 
financial or economic compensation Vietnam owed back to its suppliers is uncertain. But 
by the end of the Cold War, as Vietnam rebranded its economic model under the Doi Moi 
reforms, the Vietnam People’s Army had to maintain a very large inventory of increasingly 
obsolescent equipment—items that were not only well into their second careers, but that 
were also not suitable to address the kinds of strategic concerns Vietnam would develop in 
the new century. 
2. Poking the Dragon: Modernization through the 21st Century 
Vietnam’s story in the post-Cold War era is one of growth and modernization in 
both the civil and military sectors. In large part due to the successful marketization reforms 
of the late 1980s, the nation’s GDP has grown by approximately five to nine percent 
annually since the late 1980s.259 Its purchasing power roughly doubled each decade.260 
With its territory intact and the former southern and northern polities united, Hanoi’s 
strategic goals shifted away from defending the homeland from foreign army incursions, 
and toward deterring an increasingly expansionist China from chipping away at 
Vietnamese maritime claims in the adjacent waters of the South China Sea.261 Hanoi had 
to modernize its offshore conflict toolbox, despite persistent army “parochialism” and an 
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institutional structure that hindered development of the VPN and VAD-AF as independent 
entities.262  
Thayer ascribes Vietnam’s drive toward force modernization to two interrelated 
factors: the entry into force of UNCLOS III in 1994, with the accompanying legal basis for 
200 nautical mile EEZ claims, and “contingencies in the South China Sea.”263 The region’s 
most significant events for Vietnam were the discovery of harvestable oil and gas resources 
in the South China Sea combined with Beijing’s increasingly substantial assertions of 
Chinese sovereignty within the so-called Nine-Dash Line, which had existed hazily in 
Beijing’s political thought since 1947.264 China’s 1974 seizure of the Paracels and 
“skirmishes” in the Spratlys a decade later—which Vietnam’s anemic navy could not 
seriously dispute—served as a warning of things to come to leadership in Hanoi.265 
Although traditional armed conflicts over South China Sea claims decreased in the current 
century, China continues to test foreign claims in the South China Sea by other means, 
typically asserting their will through “gray zone” measures that do not amount to overt 
military conflict.266 These actions have ranged from anchoring a state-affiliated oil drilling 
platform in the claimed Vietnamese EEZ in 2014, to blocking attempts to resupply Filipino 
forces stationed at Second Thomas Shoal the same year, to leveraging law enforcement 
and non-military vessels to ram civilian boats.267 For Vietnam to successfully repulse 
foreign claimants to its EEZ, the military would need to adapt its maritime-capable forces 
to be able to track, surveil and realistically deter interlopers. 
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C. ARMS TRADE PATTERNS 
Vietnam has emphasized its air, naval and coast guard modernization efforts, 
reflecting shifts in its strategic interests—from land war in Cambodia to industrializing its 
economy and defending its interests from perceived Chinese encroachment in the twenty-
first century.268 Sourcing the desired equipment from China was off the table given the 
strategic situation (somewhat ironically, since China is otherwise Vietnam’s most 
significant trading partner and has become a significant arms exporter for multiple other 
Asian states).269 The two nations have not engaged in any notable arms transfers since the 
1960s.270 Instead Russia has played the critical role in supplying all branches of the 
Vietnamese military. As shown in Figure 9, whenever arms transfers to Vietnam spiked 
after 1992, Russia was the foremost supplier state. 
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Figure 9. Russian Arms Exports to Vietnam, SIPRI Trend-Indicator 
Values (TIV) in Millions USD, 1992–2018271 
 
1. Land Forces 
The Soviet Union furnished hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers to 
North Vietnam (often along with China) as well as reunified Vietnam (often as a form of 
aid against China).272 After the end of its land wars in Asia and the collapse of the USSR 
in the 1990s, Vietnam focused on military acquisitions for the maritime and aerospace 
domains, and overall demand for transfers of army materiel subsided. In 2017, however, 
Hanoi and Moscow finalized a transfer of T-90S and main battle tanks and T-90SK 
(command variant) main battle tanks, sixty-four in total.273 The T-90 is a significant 
improvement over the T-55 and T-62 tanks in use elsewhere in the Army, and is expected 
to replace some of the existing VPA inventory.274 
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2. Maritime Platforms 
The six Kilo submarines ordered from Russia are the most notable example of 
Vietnam’s expanding naval aspirations. They are the VPN’s only full-sized submarines, 
thus the acquisition marked a major new capability for the Navy.275 Hanoi placed a U.S. 
$2.6 billion order with Russia for the six submarines in 2009.276 Delivery of the first hull 
took place in 2012, and the final boat was delivered from St. Petersburg in January 2017, 
generally on time and on budget, after bow-to-stern construction and sea trials in Russia.277 
The “636M” Kilo variant purchased from Russia is capable of deploying Klub family anti-
ship cruise missiles and land attack cruise missiles (or comparably sized systems) as well 
as torpedoes and mines.278 Because the exact missile load installed is readily changeable 
and the onboard missile systems can be upgraded repeatedly, the Kilo acquisition will 
provide Vietnam with an avenue to purchase compatible weapons abroad or to collaborate 
with foreign research teams (Russian or otherwise) for decades to come.  
Vietnam’s second most significant naval acquisition is six Gepard-3.9 guided 
missile frigates, four of which have been delivered from Russia as of 2018.279 The class is 
small and modestly armed for a frigate, but the acquisition marked a major upgrade from 
the VPN’s former largest naval combatants, Petya-class corvettes purchased second-hand 
from the Soviet Union in the 1980s.280 Hanoi was able to tailor each order to suit the 
VPN’s capability gaps; the first two ships of the class were optimized for anti-surface 
warfare, carrying eight SS-N-25 Switchblade missiles aboard, while the second pair 
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delivered added heavy torpedoes and anti-submarine rocket launchers for a more robust 
anti-submarine warfare capability.281 As with the Kilo, the frigates’ weapons loadout will 
provide opportunities for continued arms deals with Russia as well as a convenient platform 
to deploy license-built and possibly indigenously designed armament in the future. With 
effective operation of Gepard frigates and Kilo submarines, Vietnam can establish a viable 
blue water capability in the South China Sea to address what Hanoi sees as provocative 
Chinese actions within the enclosed sea. 
Vietnam ordered numerous FAC and patrol craft for Navy and Coast Guard, 
demonstrating diversification of suppliers in this field as well. In 2016 Indian firm Larsen 
and Toubro signed a $100 million deal with Vietnam for delivery of four 35-meter patrol 
craft for the Vietnamese border guard’s use.282 
3. Air and Air Defense Forces 
The Vietnam People’s Air Forces are phasing out legacy equipment with a small 
but capable fighter inventory through direct delivery: 
In January 2009, Rosoboronexport signed approximately $500m worth 
contract with Vietnam for the delivery of eight Su-30MK2 aircraft to the 
Vietnam People’s Air Force. Vietnam ordered for an additional 20 fighters 
in July 2010. The first batch of four aircraft was delivered in June 2011. A 
contract for a further 12 aircraft was signed in August 2013. The last two 
aircraft were delivered by the first half of 2016.283 
Like China and India, who historically relied on imported Russian airframes before 
undertaking (with mixed results) the indigenization of their own aircraft supply lines, 
Hanoi currently favors outright importation of the new aircraft. Considerations of 
transportability, delicate avionics suites, and the high physical performance demands 
associated with many modern aircraft all add complexity to manufacturing and transfer 
processes. These factors likely incentivize direct delivery of aircraft over nose-to-tail 
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production in country, even in nations that are capable of building or assembling some 
other military systems indigenously. 
As of 2017, “Vietnam is buying S-400 Triumf air defense systems and MiG-35 
multirole combat aircraft, which will replace the Air Force’s MiG-21 fighters.”284 
However, Russia failed to get its foot in the door vis-à-vis unmanned aircraft. Vietnam’s 
UAV purchases were from Israel and Belarus in 2009–15, which informed an indigenous 
UAV design fielded the following year.285 
D. FORMAL AND INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS 
1. Economic/Commercial Accommodations Made by Russia 
Hanoi does not publicize most military expenditure specifics, but Russia appears to 
be continuing some of the old tradition of military aid to Vietnam. A Russian official 
boasted of the “billion-dollar” relationship between the two nations.286 Vietnam’s 2017 
tank acquisition was “reportedly valued at $250 million” and is “partly funded by Russian 
aid credits.”287  
As seen in Chapters III and IV, refurbishment of second-hand systems can provide 
a means for nations to acquire major (if often outdated) military systems at a theoretically 
lower cost and on a shorter procurement timeline than delivery of new equipment. Second-
hand equipment is sometimes modified prior to delivery to Vietnam. However, this has 
only been applicable to non-Russian transfers, (e.g., from Ukraine, Czech Republic, 
Canada or the United States), as Vietnam has tended to purchase new builds from 
Russia.288 
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Russia has provided both maintenance and personnel training contracts to Vietnam, 
but it is not the only supplier country to do so. Vietnamese submarine crews trained for the 
Kilo-class submarine in St. Petersburg prior to delivery of the VPN’s six submarines.289 
India has also undertaken training of Vietnamese submarine crews aboard INS Satavahana 
facilities, the dedicated sub training facility based in Vishakhapatnam, a move 
characterized in the Indian press as “a major bilateral initiative in the emerging strategic 
partnership.”290 
2. Technology Accommodations Made by Russia  
a. Technology Transfer and Indigenous Production 
Vietnam has increased its capacity for indigenous production of military 
equipment, typically via the intermediate steps of technology transfer or licensed 
production, although it continues to import its most significant systems from abroad. In 
2001, Vietnam assembled a single Type-1241 patrol craft from a kit shipped in from 
Russia.291 By 2016, six of the VPN’s eight Russian-designed Tarantul-5 class guided 
missile patrol craft were produced in Vietnam.292 While Russia was Vietnam’s most 
important arms supplier overall, Hanoi also collaborated with secondary partners such as 
Belarus and Israel for its indigenous unmanned aerial vehicle program; imports from these 
two nations beginning in 2009, plus technical assistance from Belarus, laid the groundwork 
for the launch of Vietnam’s own surveillance UAV in 2015.293 
In 2012, Russia and Vietnam announced a joint missile development venture in the 
vein of India’s BrahMos project, which Hanoi had expressed interest in purchasing since 
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2011.294 In 2015, Vietnam began production of the KCT-15 anti-ship missile group, air- 
and surface-launched variants of the SS-N-25 Switchblade that were produced under 
license in Vietnam.295 The extent of the modifications and Vietnam’s exact role in 
production remains unclear—thus, it also remains unclear whether this is a case of in-
country final assembly, full licensed production or if the claim of joint development really 
has any teeth.296 With respect to the BrahMos, however, as of 2016 Vietnam was 
shortlisted as a buyer for the missile by India rather than Russia. Russian officials had 
reportedly greenlit follow-on exports from India during the initial development 
agreements.297 
3. Overtly Political/Strategic Accommodations Made by Russia 
a. Bilateral Military Cooperation 
Present-day Russia enjoys a legacy of popular affection in Vietnam thanks to the 
extensive military aid the Soviet Union granted in the 1960s and 1970s.298 Russian ships 
were a consistent presence at Cam Ranh Bay naval base until the Pacific Fleet's formal 
withdrawal in the early 2000s.299 Actual bilateral defense cooperation today is limited but 
symbolically potent. The bilateral arms trade and technology transfer relationship functions 
as an important component of the two countries’ strategic relationship per se; the Russian 
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ambassador to Vietnam highlighted “cooperation in…military science-technique” when 
presenting Vietnam’s deputy defense minister with the Order of Friendship of Russia.300 
Vladivostok hosted a group of Vietnamese warships in a recent fleet review, marking an 
unusual out-of-area deployment for the VPN; additionally, Hanoi and Moscow have 
announced plans for “joint rescue drills” late in 2019.301  
b. Energy Security 
Russo-Vietnamese energy cooperation shares several parallels to defense 
cooperation – both fields are critical to national security, tend to have a technical character, 
and ride on a legacy of Soviet benevolence. Although not directly related to arms transfers, 
energy security for Vietnam is intertwined with the maritime boundaries disputes that have 
also shaped Hanoi's current strategic interests. The 2014 standoff over a Chinese oil rig 
positioned in disputed waters of the South China Sea touched off an “increasingly 
antagonistic” relationship between Vietnam and China.302  
Hanoi still looks to Moscow as a senior partner in the energy cooperation field even 
as it diversifies its foreign arms suppliers. Baev and Tønnesson imply that the bilateral 
energy collaboration is almost entirely politically motivated on Moscow's part, as the 
partnership is not fiscally profitable for the Russian state and does not significantly enhance 
that sector of the Russian economy.303 This leaves political payoff as the main goal of 
Russo-Vietnamese collaboration in this sector: another venue for Moscow to signal good 
intentions to Hanoi despite increasing commitment to Beijing. 
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E. VOLUME AND TRENDS 
Vietnam does not seek to establish full lines of indigenous production in the near 
to mid-term. Economic growth has enabled increased defense spending, of which arms 
imports form a critical component. However, the country lacks robust defense R&D and 
manufacturing sectors. Currently, indigenous production is limited to combat and transport 
vehicles, small arms, unmanned systems and fairly constrained licensed production and 
shipbuilding efforts for major military systems (e.g., missiles, ships). For Hanoi, it is more 
effective and timely to import the systems it desires than to establish the infrastructure 
required to build a comparable capability in country. Vietnam has, however, sought to 
diversify its dependence on Russia during equipment life cycles, particularly by building 
its relationship with India, as demonstrated by recent discussions of missile sales and the 
bilateral submarine crew training program.304  
F. OUTLOOK 
In the immediate context, arms transfers from Russia strengthen political ties, 
although perhaps weapons play second string to energy collaboration, which Baev and 
Tønnesson interpret as crucial to maintenance of Moscow's relationship with Hanoi.305 
Economically, arms deals are significant but not an overwhelming influence. Vietnam’s 
GDP has doubled since 2006 (U.S. $91 billion to U.S. $187 billion in 2018, both constant 
2010 prices).306 SIPRI estimates Vietnamese military expenditures were 1.8–2.4% of GDP 
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since 2003 and 7.2–8.2% of government expenditures overall.307 Defense spending is on 
pace with GDP growth.308 
Russia has been crucial in helping Vietnam avoid destabilization from the rise of 
China. Shang-Su Wu argues that “in contrast to military modernisation, military 
obsolescence has equal, if not greater, potential to destabilise the regional situation.”309 
Obsolescence has two main causes: it can be brought about by an outside party’s 
modernization, as well as by degradation of existing materiel.310 Since wear and tear or 
simple aging of military equipment is inevitable, a country that is treading water 
maintaining its current force level, while a nearby nation (with perceived aggressive 
intentions) is also improving its own military through modernization, is doubly threatened.  
Vietnam is unique in its region, as its booming economy has allowed vast increases 
in defense spending over the past decade. However, its legacy inventory of Soviet military 
equipment is growing more costly to maintain, and Hanoi still has limited funds and human 
capital to invest in modernization, especially compared to a billion-person manufacturing 
and scientific powerhouse like China or India. Wu sees Hanoi as “[facing] a strategic 
dilemma in military acquisition: either to spare certain resources to modernise the VPA 
and other neglected capabilities, or to continue its concentration of investment on maritime 
and aerial capability to cater to…territorial disputes.”311  
Under Walt’s framework of alliance formation, a threat situation provides a strong 
impetus to align with other, less threatening states to balance the threat.312 The “balancing” 
species of alliance formation tends to be preferred by states unless they are “especially 
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weak and isolated.”313 Vietnam is attempting to stabilize its own destabilizing situation 
driven by Chinese modernization, by focusing its budget on modernizing critical 
capabilities, leaving its land forces in a state of increasing obsolescence.314 Historically in 
Vietnam’s case, that less threatening state was the Soviet Union, and its main successor 
state Russia has ridden the resulting legacy of popular goodwill and institutional ties in 
both countries.315 But Moscow’s post-Cold War ties to Beijing in the energy and defense 
sectors—and the Russian economic dependence on Chinese money, especially after the 
2014 Crimean annexation—makes Russia an increasingly unreliable partner.316 This may 
contribute toward Vietnam’s overtures to India, the United States, Japan, and its fellow 
ASEAN members.  
Hanoi can continue to leverage Moscow’s investment in maintaining good relations 
to outsized Vietnamese benefit. Russia has additional incentive to offer Vietnam arms deals 
that are too sweet to refuse, as one element of a virtuous cycle of alliance formation.317 
From the Kremlin’s perspective, Vietnam provides Russia an independent ally in southeast 
Asia outside the strongest portion of the Chinese sphere of influence, since Vietnam and 
China’s territorial disputes in the South China Sea put the two countries at odds. (Despite 
their disagreements, Vietnam and China maintain normal diplomatic relations and China 
is Vietnam’s largest trade partner.318)  
Russian arms transfers give Vietnam an affordable means of accomplishing its 
strategic goals of force modernization and Chinese deterrence, although other suppliers 
could also provide this capability, albeit with less favorable financial terms – and are likely 
to do so in the future. However, arms transfers and energy cooperation already approach 
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the limits of what Russia can offer Vietnam.319 Outside of these fields, Russia is not a vital 
trade partner for Vietnam, although the two states are aiming to “triple trade by 2020” from 
its 2017 value of approximately U.S. $3.55 billion.320 If the Russo-Vietnamese 
relationship stagnates, other countries will likely step in. 
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VI. PATTERNS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter will discuss the motivations of customer states in procuring weapons 
from Russian suppliers. For each of the case studies presented in Chapters III–V, I will ask 
if Russia in its capacity as an arms supplier can be categorized as: 
1. The most affordable option from a financial/fiscal standpoint 
2. The best-tailored option from a technological standpoint 
3. A neutral or counterbalancing option from a political standpoint 
These factors are interrelated, since national defense involves all three categories. 
The discussions of the previous three chapters indicate that all of them are applicable to 
some extent in any arms transfer agreement. 
The chapter will finish with a brief discussion of the implications of the case 
studies, oriented toward profiling future customer states and predicting whether continued 
arms transfers from Russia will be more likely to stabilize or destabilize regional dynamics. 
A. CHINA 
In the case of China, Russia is best interpreted as the arms supplier that was best 
technologically suited to the needs of its customer. While affordability and international 
optics were important concerns, China most importantly took advantage of the Russian 
willingness to part with large amounts of second-hand Soviet equipment, as well as deliver 
new-built platforms, to form the baseline for its own military modernization, expansion, 
and drive toward defense self-sufficiency.  
China is now a major weapons exporting country, as Figure 10 shows. According 
to SIPRI data, Chinese arms exports have now approached 1980s levels, when the main 
recipients of Chinese weapons were Iran, Iraq and Egypt.321 Today the Chinese arms 
export market is focused in southern Asia—Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar.322 
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Additionally, the most significant expansion in exports from China pertained to air defense 
systems and ships, two fields in which Russia also specializes.323 This will be detrimental 
for the Russian arms export industry in the long run—if not in absolute numbers (although 
these have declined slightly since 2014), then in share of the market. Now that China is 
once again increasing its arms sales to third parties, Beijing and Moscow may find 
themselves competing for the same contracts.  
Figure 10. Major World Arms Exporters, SIPRI Trend-Indicator 
Values (TIV), 2000–2018324 
 
China has become independent in many stages of arms procurement, from design 
to manufacture to disposition. Since China has not always enjoyed its current levels of self-
sufficiency in the defense manufacturing sector, Russia provided a convenient source to 
fill gapped capabilities at acceptable financial costs and timelines, especially as Moscow 
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sought to sell off Soviet equipment and stave off financial crises in its defense-industrial 
sector. Thus, Russia was once the fiscally “affordable option” for arms transfers. This 
remains true today but in more limited circumstances. Today Beijing prioritizes indigenous 
manufacturing, as observed in the rapid expansion of the PLAN and PLAAF. There is still 
a demand in the PLA for specific Russian-manufactured systems: for example aircraft 
engines—due to problems with indigenous steel quality—or cutting-edge systems such as 
the long range SA-21 air defense system, which provides a capability China may want to 
emulate domestically.325 However, widespread acquisition of entire platforms is likely to 
remain a phenomenon of previous decades. 
China seeks to establish indigenous capability through the full spectrum of defense 
activities. For a state in this position, being able to plow additional R&D or infrastructure 
costs back into local economies, rather than paying a smaller amount to a supplier state for 
a comparable platform, may be another techno-commercial incentive against buying 
abroad. While I have generally not been able to determine monetary costs of Chinese 
weapons manufacturing, the competitiveness of its exports abroad indicates that 
development and manufacturing costs are comparable to or lower than those of other 
potential supplier states. (Alternately, Beijing has decided gaining a foothold in the 
international arms market justifies selling equipment at a financial loss – in which case 
there are other forms of capital at stake.) According to SIPRI data, China exported more 
than twice the value of military equipment during 2010–2017 than the entire previous 
decade.326 When NATO member Turkey sought a contractor for establishment of its $3.4 
billion long-range air defense system in 2013, the Chinese bid was selected over offers 
from three other competitors, including the United States and Russia, on account of “lower 
price, favorable technology transfer conditions, and early delivery” of certain 
components.327 After significant NATO backlash, the deal was cancelled two years later; 
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Russia eventually stepped in, offering favorable lira-ruble exchange terms and no co-
production for transfer of the S-400 (NATO reporting name SA-21 Growler), a system that 
both China and India have also sought to procure.328  
Today, Russia is China’s preferred supplier for foreign arms acquisitions that are 
tailored to address specific technology gaps in the military branches. Such sales can 
provide technological templates for future adaptation and domestic production. This is 
probably the ultimate goal of current acquisitions like the SA-21, given the outcome of 
previous decades’ arms transfers and Beijing’s tendency to reverse engineer transferred 
equipment or conduct industrial espionage. In the 1990s and 2000s, it was second-hand 
Soviet technology that provided the foreign baseline for expansion and modernization of 
the Chinese military. The dissolution of the USSR provided China a unique target of 
opportunity for massive arms acquisitions and thus technology transfer. China was a 
practical customer, and while post-Soviet Russia (unsurprisingly) furnished most of the 
equipment transferred during this period, Beijing was also willing to purchase from other 
former Soviet states if they provided a desired capability, such as the acquisition of its 
Kuznetsov-class aircraft carrier from Ukraine. 
Outside of the defense sector, Russia is increasingly dependent on China.329 The 
relationship is asymmetrical, with China the more influential player. This gives Beijing the 
political leverage. Russia is a political and economic pariah in the West due to the 2014 
annexation of Crimea, so Asia is the crucial market for Russian energy exports. The 
Chinese economy seriously outweighs that of Russia. Russian efforts to revitalize its Far 
East, whose ports might compete commercially with Chinese coastal cities, have mostly 
failed.330 From a threat standpoint, Russian president Putin is oriented primarily against 
NATO, but increasingly seeks a means to balance China’s influence in the Pacific. 
President Xi, however, is most interested in asserting Chinese sovereignty within the first 
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island chain and Indo-Pacific, which brings it into conflict with nations that have overtly 
expressed friendship with Russia, e.g., India and Vietnam. 
From Beijing’s perspective, the collapse of the USSR provided a fortuitous 
opportunity to revitalize the People’s Liberation Army and paramilitary organizations, 
while leaping forward technologically vis-à-vis its own DIS production capabilities. The 
Chinese buildup has had a ripple effect throughout Asia, prompting additional military 
expansions that both China and Russia will try to exploit in the decades to come. 
B. INDIA 
Russia is best analyzed as a technologically ideal partner for India throughout the 
last several decades of the two countries’ relations. It must be added, however, that 
Rosoboronexport was often a more cost-effective source of weapons than the Indian 
defense-industrial sector, given the frequent schedule delays and cost overruns of multiple 
high-profile indigenous military projects. At various points since India’s independence, 
including in the present day, Moscow has also functioned as a valuable political ally, even 
if the relationship rarely goes beyond the security and energy fields. 
Through sales, technology transfer agreements and joint development projects, 
Russia has greatly accelerated India’s military modernization. Although India has a number 
of arms deals in place with Western suppliers, Russia continues to provide critical 
brainpower and arms manufacturing capacity, despite less than smooth sailing in many of 
New Delhi’s procurement dealings with Rosoboronexport. By undertaking joint ventures 
like the BrahMos, India has also set itself up for a certain level of path dependency in the 
decades to come. Russia has also provided India with a number of technological templates, 
e.g., lease of the Akula nuclear-powered attack submarine and sale of Vikramaditya aircraft 
carrier, that incentivize compatibility with Russian equipment. Unlike China, however, 
India has not become a major exporter of weapons—SIPRI values Indian arms exports 
since 2010 at about U.S. $200 million in total.331 The eventual sale of the BrahMos will 
add significantly to New Delhi’s weapons export revenue, but Indian sales to third parties 
                                                 
331 SIPRI, “Importer/Exporter TIV Tables.” 
 94 
was blessed by Russia from the beginning. Moscow does not fear that India will soon eat 
into its market share. 
In the political arena, aligning with Russia counterbalances the threat of Pakistan, 
India’s greatest strategic concern. In the longer term, the relationship may help balance the 
Chinese threat as well. India is reacting to Chinese military buildup and growing power 
projection capability—exemplified by Beijing’s continuous deployment of naval assets to 
the Indian Ocean and Chinese aid in developing Gwadar and Djibouti as part of the one 
belt, one road concept—by seeking less threatening nations to ally. This has resulted in 
increased military cooperation with minor states in South Asia. Military-technical 
cooperation and the strategic partnership with Russia is another major way to signal such 
an alignment, although as discussed in Chapter IV, New Delhi is carefully signaling its 
neutrality in other geopolitical environments by maintaining cordial relations with the 
United States and other Western powers as well. 
India’s ability to procure military equipment from abroad was severely curtailed in 
the 1990s, and Russia proved a financially accommodating supplier. The Yeltsin 
administration continued to work with India through the financial crisis and recovery of 
the 1990s, and ruble-rupee financed deals, bypassing the U.S. dollar, still occur. Significant 
industrial offsets were built into many transfer agreements. Indigenous production in India 
remains behind-schedule and over-budget, and it continues to be cheaper to procure some 
major systems abroad than to “make in India,” as evidenced by the cost differential between 
India’s foreign-built and domestically built Talwar-class destroyers, as well as multiple 
delays and expense overruns associated with the Kalvari-class (Scorpène) submarines 
currently under licensed construction in Mumbai.332 With Russian procurements in 
particular, though, delays in delivery, cost overruns and maintenance problems make the 
fiscal situation less than ideal, and have cost India millions. 
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As for Vietnam, arms transfers from Russia represent the most economically 
feasible pathway to achieving its own military capability goals, since Vietnam’s own 
defense budget is a good deal more constrained than either of the other two case study 
countries. However, Hanoi’s military goals are responsive to the growth of China, and the 
Russo-Vietnamese relationship must be seen through the lens of both states’ mutual 
political dependency.333 
Russia reaped the monetary benefits of Soviet-Vietnamese military cooperation in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Vietnam accepted substantial Soviet military aid during the Cold 
War, in pursuit of strategic/political goals and without much financial cost to Vietnam. But 
Vietnam’s mostly Soviet inventory at the end of the Cold War resulted in both 
technological and financial path dependency, as follow-on Russian systems tended to be 
more compatible with legacy Soviet equipment than deliveries from other suppliers 
countries would be. Vietnam has a much smaller potential for economies of scale in 
indigenous weapons production than a larger, wealthier nation like India or China. This 
limits the feasibility of a hypothetical ‘make in Vietnam’ effort (although such efforts have 
occurred, e.g., indigenization of patrol ship production), as there is only so much room in 
the defense budget for R&D and indigenous procurement, and a smaller pool of domestic 
brainpower to draw on. Under these circumstances, arms transfers from foreign suppliers 
are crucial to military modernization. 
The Soviet Union was Vietnam’s primary technology supplier during the Cold War 
by dint of the scale of its military aid. After the collapse, Russia remained the preferred 
partner by virtue of path dependency and institutional habits. However, today Hanoi is 
realizing that non-Russian entities may provide more pleasingly packaged capabilities at a 
competitive cost, and may also be willing to provide a level of technology transfer 
comparable to that provided by Russia. Thus, Vietnam will continue to diversify its arms 
supplier portfolio. 
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Hanoi prizes friendship with Moscow as a means of countering China, both 
historically and in the present day. This reading fits into Stephen Walt’s theory of alliance 
formation, when two weaker states align to balance a stronger threat state and stabilize a 
regional power imbalance.334 Moscow is also extremely interested in maintaining a strong 
relationship with Vietnam, as its investment in the Vietnamese energy sector suggests. 
However, the increasing Russian economic and political dependence on China works to 
undermine the notion of Russia as a trusted political partner.335 For the administrations in 
both Hanoi and New Delhi, Moscow is re-orienting toward Beijing whether it wants to or 
not. Vietnamese (and Indian) leadership will likely draw closer to Chinese rivals in the 
region—the United States, Japan—as a reflexive response to this shifting geopolitical 
environment.336 
D. IMPLICATIONS 
1. Future Russian Arms Transfers 
What might a prospective Russian arms customer look like? The interaction 
between purchaser state motivations to import Russian-made defense systems and Russian 
motivations to export them indicates that there is a wide range of potential purchasing 
countries. Nevertheless, two country profiles seem most likely:  
1. The customer is either a developing state—not a wealthy one—seeking to 
add or enhance a basic to mid-level capability at comparatively low cost; 
2. Or the customer is a developed state that is not aligned with the U.S. or 
NATO and seeks to add specific advanced capabilities to its repertoire. 
The obvious exception among the NATO countries is Turkey, whose relationship with the 
remainder of NATO has become increasingly strained while drawing closer to Russia 
under the Erdogan administration. In addition to delivery of the SA-21 Growler air defense 
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system, which commenced in 2019, Ankara has also expressed interest in acquiring fifth-
generation Su-57 Felon and Su-35 Flanker-E jet fighters from Moscow following the 
withdrawal of the American offer to supply the F-35 Lightning II to Turkey.337 The 
retraction of the offer was reportedly directly tied to the SA-21 deal.338 It may also be 
related to disapproval from the United States over Turkey's hostility toward its Kurdish 
minority and general misalignment over the Syrian conflict, both of which add pressure to 
the NATO ties. 
Given the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region, potential buyer states could also 
be characterized as: 
3. Countries with unfriendly neighbors that are modernizing their military 
forces (especially with the assistance of states oriented against Russia), 
and thus increasing in threat. 
There are unlikely to be any true successors to China and India, at least not in Asia. Those 
two nations will continue to skirmish over influence in the Indo-Pacific, and right now 
China has the upper hand. But there is a high potential for more Vietnams, as the growth 
of both of the Asian giants continue to worry their smaller neighbors. An expanding 
economy is also probably an important precondition, as mere maintenance of existing 
military equipment could easily consume the defense budget of an economically stagnant 
state.339 
In southeastern Asia, where most states fit the first customer profile above, 
Indonesia and Malaysia have begun modernizing their militaries relying on both Russian 
and (to a lesser extent) Indian equipment as a response to China, in the pattern of 
Vietnam.340 In southern Asia, Pakistan, Myanmar and Bangladesh have all become 
significant customer states for Russian arms vendors; in Pakistan’s case primarily to 
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counter India, itself a response to Chinese expansion. Yet arms exports from Chinese 
manufacturers to many nations in the Asia-Pacific are growing rapidly. Figure 11 illustrates 
the trend. If we disregard transactions with India and Vietnam, we see that in the last decade 
the volume of Chinese arms exports to maritime Asia have edged out the Russian 
competition (although Russia remains the dominant arms supplier for the central Asian 
states) and are approaching volumes similar to U.S. exports in the region, which have also 
declined concurrent to the upswing in Chinese exports.341 If the Philippines’ defense 
relationship with the United States deteriorates, Manila could turn to Russia for future arms 
acquisitions as well. 
Figure 11. Arms Exports to Maritime Asian States (Excluding China, 
India and Vietnam) from Selected Suppliers, SIPRI Trend-Indicator Values 
(TIV) in Millions USD, 2000–2018342 
 
 
Russia is a major arms supplier for most of the Mediterranean African states. The 
Kremlin’s involvement outside of its traditional Asian and northern African markets, 
however, is less secure and could be overtaken by fresh competition. Figure 12 shows that 
China is already a strong competitor for sub-Saharan Africa, a region that was long ignored 
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by Western defense manufacturers and represents the world’s least saturated arms market. 
Most of the states in this region would also fit into the first customer profile listed above. 
Euro-American defense firms will compete with Rosoboronexport in wealthier Western 
markets, including those of South America, although Russia consummated a significant 
transfer deal with Venezuela in 2014 and will continue to seek export opportunities in Latin 
America.  
Figure 12. Arms Exports to Sub-Saharan African States from Selected 
Suppliers, SIPRI Trend-Indicator Values (TIV) in Millions USD, 2000–
2018343 
 
Another avenue that Russia might continue to explore is joint development ventures 
with junior partners – a la the BrahMos, FGFA and MTA aircraft projects with India, AS-
18 modifications with China, or the KCT-15 missile with Vietnam. Such projects 
theoretically demand less labor and time from Russian personnel, are scalable to match the 
user state’s indigenous production goals, have soft power payoffs, and do not necessarily 
need to be destined for use in the Russian military. Russia is a long-established supplier 
state, while the Chinese defense industry is still building its reputation as a reliable business 
partner.344 The Kremlin might still enjoy an advantage pursuing this type of arms deal, 
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even in regions where Chinese-made weapons exports have generally overtaken those of 
Russia. 
2. Outlook/Significance 
In the twenty-eight years since the end of the Cold War, the international 
community has undergone significant structural, technological and social changes. The 
transition from a bipolar power structure to a multipolar one has not been marked by 
devastating great-power wars but by unease, uncertainty and varying levels of 
unwillingness to revise existing international norms. The development of the microcircuit, 
personal computer, worldwide web, and wireless connectivity have revolutionized 
communications across the planet; but in addition to opening up a new global commons, 
they have created a new potential avenue for future conflicts, made data protection 
infinitely more complex, and implanted new nodes of vulnerability within critical 
infrastructure. Technological proliferation has improved the lives of billions and enriched 
economies across the world, but has narrowed the access gap to advanced technology 
between large and small powers, including non-state actors. Ideology no longer neatly 
divides the world into spheres of influence separated by buffer zones. The massive wars of 
the twentieth century, with their massive human costs, are in the past, replaced by 
asymmetric and hybrid warfare. Moreover, there is a strong political will to avoid repeating 
wars of such enormous magnitude.  
Military systems manufactured today can rarely ignore these new realities. They 
must be increasingly sophisticated, precise, affordable and competitive due to the 
expanding range of both suppliers and buyers.345 Furthermore, as weapons and sensors 
advance, it becomes increasingly difficult to defend against them in such a way as to also 
not harm the simultaneous use of friendly gear—for example, generating an electro-
magnetic pulse or broadband jamming signal to deploy against adversary electronics would 
likely also interfere with friendly electronics. This increases the research and development 
costs of new systems, whether offensive or defensive, as they must try to anticipate as many 
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future vulnerabilities as possible. It may also incentivize the retention of older, more 
survivable backup systems, which can add to the operating costs of military equipment and 
personnel. 
Countries react strongly to others’ military modernization (or to the corollary, their 
own military obsolescence) if they perceive an increasing threat. Therefore, arms exports 
can be potentially destabilizing or stabilizing, depending on the customer state. As Wu 
highlights, a nation that modernizes or expands its military (by any means) might cause a 
ripple effect as neighboring states find their own militaries becoming outdated, and either 
boost domestic defense production or look abroad to rapidly modernize their own 
militaries.346 In the case studies discussed earlier, this can be seen with Vietnam’s reaction 
to the Chinese military growth of the 1990s, as well as India’s response to Pakistani arms 
acquisitions at various points throughout their shared history.347 Such second-order 
reactions could result in follow-on opportunities for an arms supplier if the supplier is able 
to arrange arms transfer agreements with reacting states. Could this suggest that a 
prospective arms exporter might have profit-based incentive to encourage arms transfers 
in regions where supplier niches are not filled, regardless of whether the competition is 
stabilizing or destabilizing?  
Russia, which sees itself as a “maverick” on the world stage, is willing to play both 
sides, as seen with its ongoing arms transfer relationships with all three case study 
countries.348 It is unclear if this is a calculated strategic move on the Kremlin’s part or 
merely a matter of structural necessity. As discussed in Chapter II of this thesis, the Russian 
defense industrial sector depends on a strong international export market, as domestic 
military demand is finite and most of the constituent companies do not have significant 
lines of effort outside the DIS.349 (The same can be said of the Russian energy industries.) 
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Although Russia, particularly desperate for cash flow in the Yeltsin era, played a key role 
in jumpstarting China’s military expansion, it has also facilitated the balancing expansions 
that followed in other Asian nations. China’s search for regional hegemony has been the 
principal destabilizer since 1991, but both India’s and Vietnam’s recent arms acquisitions 
have made the Indo-Pacific region more stable by challenging the Chinese rise to some 
extent. 
Russia will remain a major player on the world arms transfer market, and has 
contributed to the creation of additional potentially significant suppliers. From an 
American perspective, Russia has been willing to export weapons to countries that United 
States policymakers find objectionable (e.g., Venezuela, Turkey), which could lead to 
destabilization or an effect contrary to U.S. national interests. Yet Russian arms transfers 
have also enabled recipient countries to stand up to strategic adversaries of the United 
States. Russian-made arms will continue to play a significant role in the global arena for 
decades to come. It behooves American policymakers and military personnel to understand 
what factors might continue to attract customer states toward a deal with Rosoboronexport.  
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